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Zusammenfassung
Infrastrukturlose Kommunikationssubstrate wie drahtlose multi-hop Ad-hoc-Netze in Kombination mit
dezentralen, Peer-to-Peer-basierten Anwendungen ermöglichen durch ihre selbstorganisierende Natur
und den Verzicht auf zentrale Instanzen den spontanen Aufbau digitaler Kommunikationsnetze. Mit
Kommunikationsendgeräten, die gleichzeitig als Vermittlungsstationen dienen und so unabhängig
von einer vorhandenen Kommunikationsinfrastruktur sind, umfassen mögliche Einsatzszenarien zum
Beispiel den Aufbau von Kommunikationsnetzen in großräumigen Katastrophenszenarien. Aus dem
Blickwinkel der Sicherheit bedeutet die Möglichkeit, selbstorganisierende Netze spontan aufzubauen,
allerdings die Abhängigkeit von der Kooperation von Geräten aus mehreren Verwaltungsstrukturen ohne
zentrale Kontrolle. Sicherheitsregelwerke, die zum Beispiel Zugriffe auf vertrauliche Dienste steuern,
können während einer spontanen Zusammenarbeit nicht als vorhanden vorausgesetzt werden.
Diese Arbeit adressiert (1) die Aufrechterhaltung der Funktionalität des Netzes in Gegenwart von
Geräten, die die kooperative Natur von infrastrukturlosen Netzen für Angriffe auf deren Verfügbarkeit
ausnutzen und (2) das Erreichen von Schutzzielen wie Authentifizierung und Zugangskontrolle in Ab-
wesenheit zentraler (vertrauter) Instanzen und vordefinierter Sicherheitsregelwerke.
Zu (1) wird ein neuartiger, positionsbasierter Verteidigungsmechanismus für infrastrukturlose Netze
vorgestellt. Da Geräte hier keiner zentralen Kontrolle unterliegen, können Netzadressen mit geringem
Aufwand geändert und adressbasierte Schutzmechanismen umgangen werden. Der positionsbasierte
Ansatz, der in dieser Arbeit entwickelt wird, benutzt die physikalische Position statt der Netzadresse
von Geräten zu deren Identifikation. Fehlverhaltende Geräte werden durch den Aufbau von Qua-
rantänegebieten, die von der Kommunikation ausgenommen werden, aus dem Netz ausgeschlossen.
Auf Basis analytischer Modelle und durch Simulationsstudien gewonnene Ergebnisse zeigen, dass auf
diese Weise die Unanfälligkeit des Verteidigungsmechanismus gegenüber Änderungen der Netzadresse
fehlverhaltender Geräte erreicht werden kann. Ein Nachteil des positionsbasierten Ansatzes ist der zur
Aufrechterhaltung der Gesamtfunktionalität des Netzes notwendige Ausschluss gutartiger Geräte, die
sich in physikalischer Nähe zu fehlverhaltenden Geräten befinden, aus dem Netz. Um diesem Effekt
entgegenzuwirken, werden zwei Ansätze vorgestellt. Durch eine adaptive Sendeleistung der gutartigen
Geräte wird die Ausdehnung der Quarantänegebiete reduziert; durch den Einsatz verzögerungstoleran-
ter Anwendungen wird die (zeitverzögerte) Kommunikation von Geräten, die sich in Quarantänege-
bieten befinden ermöglicht. Auf Basis von Simulationsstudien gewonnene Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine
adaptive Sendeleistung zur Verbesserung des positionsbasierten Verteidigungsmechanismus in Szenarien
mit geringer Mobilität genutzt werden kann. Durch den Einsatz verzögerungstoleranter Anwendungen
kann der positionsbasierte Ansatz effektiv unterstützt werden, wenn Verzögerungen in Kauf genommen
werden können.
Zu (2) werden in dieser Arbeit nutzerbasierte, kooperative Entscheidungen als Ersatz für zen-
trale, vertraute Instanzen und Sicherheitsregelwerke vorgestellt. Durch einen kooperativen Entschei-
dungsprozess basierend auf Schwellwertkryptographie wird verhindert, dass kryptographische Opera-
tionen wie das Signieren von Zertifikaten, die Zugriff auf vertrauliche Dienste gewähren, von einem
einzelnen, möglicherweise kompromittierten Gerät ausgeführt werden können. Durch das direkte Ein-
beziehen von Nutzern in spontane Entscheidungsprozesse werden sicherheitsrelevante Entscheidungen
ohne vordefinierte Sicherheitsregelwerke ermöglicht. Um die Anzahl der in einen Entscheidungsprozess
involvierten Nutzer und die Häufigkeit, mit der ein bestimmter Nutzer beteiligt ist, zu minimieren, wer-
den verschiedene Interaktionsschemata von Anfragendem und (potentiellen) Entscheidungsträgern ver-
glichen. Zur Minimierung der in eine Entscheidung involvierten Nutzer werden analytische Modelle
erstellt, die es erlauben, den Entscheidungsprozess zu steuern. Auf Basis einer prototypischen Im-
plementierung in zwei Experimentalplattformen gewonnene Ergebnisse zeigen die Anwendbarkeit der
Interaktionsschemata und die Korrektheit der analytischen Modelle.
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Abstract
Infrastructure-less communication substrates like multi-hop wireless mobile ad hoc networks in combina-
tion with applications based on decentralized networks like peer-to-peer networks facilitate establishing
digital communication services in a spontaneous way. Envisioned application scenarios include, for ex-
ample, enabling communication in large-scale disaster scenarios. Here, a preexisting communication
infrastructure might not be available. Thus, devices have to act both as communication endpoints and
routers. Built upon the paradigm of self-organization, the functionality of both infrastructure-less and
decentralized networks is based on the cooperation of the devices forming the network and on the
abandonment of fixed, central instances. From the perspective of security, being able to establish self-
organizing networks in a spontaneous way is, however, paid for by being dependent on the cooperation
of devices from many administrative domains that are beyond a central control. Further, the availability
of security policies controlling, for example, access to restricted resources can not be assumed during
spontaneous interactions.
In this thesis, we address two major resulting challenges of (1) maintaining the functionality of the
network in presence of devices that exploit the cooperative nature of infrastructure-less networks to
launch attacks on network availability and (2) achieving security objectives like authentication and ac-
cess control in the absence of a central (trusted) instance and predefined security policies.
Regarding Challenge (1), we present a novel, location-based intrusion response mechanism for
infrastructure-less networks. Since devices in infrastructure-less networks are beyond a central control,
changing network addresses of devices and, thus, circumventing conventional address-based intrusion
response solutions is possible with little effort. The location-based intrusion response approach we de-
velop within this thesis, instead, uses the physical location of devices as an identifier. Misbehaving
devices are excluded from the network by establishing quarantined areas void of communication at lo-
cations where misbehavior is detected. Our results based on analytical modeling and simulation studies
show that, this way, we render the intrusion response mechanism insusceptible to changes in addresses
of misbehaving nodes. On the downside, benign devices located in close physical proximity to misbe-
having nodes are, for the sake of overall network survivability, excluded from the network along with
misbehaving nodes. To mitigate this effect, we propose two approaches based on (a) adaptive trans-
mission power of devices to minimize the size of quarantined areas and (b) harnessing delay tolerance
of applications to enable (delayed) communication of benign devices located within quarantined ar-
eas. Our results based on simulation studies show that an adaptive transmission power can improve the
location-based intrusion response approach in scenarios with low node mobility. By harnessing delay tol-
erance, we are able to effectively support the location-based intrusion response at the cost of increased
transmission delays.
Regarding Challenge (2), we present user-based, cooperative decisions as a replacement for central
(trusted) instances and security policies. By introducing a cooperative decision process based on thresh-
old cryptography, we prevent that cryptographic operations like signing certificates that grant access
to restricted resources can be performed by a single, possibly compromised device. By involving (au-
thorized) users directly in the decision process, we enable decisions on security-related requests during
spontaneous interactions without predefined security policies. When involving users directly in decision
processes, obviously, the number of users, as well as the frequency at which one particular user is re-
quested, have to be minimized. To achieve these requirements, we discuss different interaction schemes
between a user issuing a security-related request and the (potential) users taking part in the decision
process. Subsequently, we present analytical models serving as tools for governing the decision process,
in order to minimize the number of users involved in a decision. Our results obtained from a prototype
for user-based, cooperative decisions deployed in two testbeds show the applicability of the interaction
schemes as well as the correctness of the analytical models.
iii
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1 Introduction
A legitimate start for a PhD thesis on communication networks would be something like ’In the recent
years, digital communication networks have found their way into many areas of our daily lives.’. How-
ever, for two reasons, the communication networks that are in the focus of this thesis render this start
inappropriate.
First, considering the ’way’, in terms of communication networks, we usually refer to communica-
tion infrastructures such as digital subscriber lines (DSL) or fiber-based broadband last mile connections
providing triple-play services to private households. On national scale, we see towards all-IP tending
backbone networks of communication service providers. On global scale, we have satellites and sub-
marine cables of international carriers. Internet exchange points like Amsterdam Internet Exchange
(AMS-IX) built the bridges between national and international providers. Yet, based on pure wire-
less communication, we are able to establish communication substrates that live without any of these
infrastructure components. When doing so, we also have to rethink the way applications for these
infrastructure-less environments are designed. Due to the potential mobility of nodes, the lack of a fixed
infrastructure, and the wireless data transmission, the topology of infrastructure-less communication
substrates is changing constantly. Hence, single nodes or groups of nodes may experience disconnec-
tions frequently. Deploying a centralized application on top of an infrastructure-less communication
substrate could, thus, lead to long periods of unavailability of the central instance and the services of-
fered. Applications based on decentralized networks, instead, are able to deal with the challenging
conditions of an infrastructure-less communication substrate. Operating without central instances and,
like infrastructure-less networks, built upon the paradigm of self-organization, decentralized networks
can adapt to a constantly changing network topology and maintain the availability of services. From
the technical perspective, regarding the 5-layer model of communication networks presented in [104],
we consider infrastructure-less networks on network layer and below and decentralized applications on
application layer, as shown in Figure 1.1. Altogether, being independent from preexisting infrastructures
means a gain in flexibility for opening up new application areas for digital communication networks. Yet,
especially in terms of security, it also means a loss of well-defined network borders and, thus, it means
being confronted with new challenges that cannot be overcome by security mechanisms designed for
infrastructure-based networks.
Figure 1.1: 5-layer model of communication networks showing where an infrastructure-less and decentralized
nature is considered within this thesis
Second, the infrastructure-less and decentralized networks that are in the focus of this thesis, are
not intended for deployment in our ’daily lives’. Due to the infrastructure-less nature, they cannot
keep up with the performance of infrastructure-based networks that we demand for the communication
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services we use. Network quality of service characteristics such as throughput, delay, and loss are clearly
inferior. However, communication is of vital importance also in situations beyond our daily lives, in
situations such as (large-scale) disaster scenarios, where communication infrastructures are not, or not
anymore, available. Here, we can accept a degraded network performance as a trade-off for being able
to communicate at all. Events like 9/11, the Elbe flood in 2002, or 2005 Hurricane Katrina showed that
communication in large-scale disaster scenarios is still flawed. Regarding communication solutions for
first responders, this is documented in [52, 101, 113, 64]. Research projects that consider this application
scenario are, for example, DUMBO [50] and HiMONN [44]. Both projects focus on how mobile ad hoc
networks can be deployed to support communication of first responders. However, besides supporting
communication of first responders, keeping communication channels of affected civilians alive should
not be neglected and, for example, can help to prevent mass hysteria.
In this thesis, we, thus, consider an infrastructure-less communication network as it might be estab-
lished to enable communication in large-scale disaster scenarios for anyone affected. We assume that
any device, of affected civilians as well as of emergency response units, that has wireless communica-
tion capabilities is used to form a scenario-wide network. Due to the resulting inherent vulnerability,
effective security mechanisms are a basic requirement. In the following, we briefly identify properties of
infrastructure-less and decentralized communication networks. We shortly summarize the state of the
art and derive implications of the infrastructure-less and decentralized nature on security.
1.1 Infrastructure-less Networks and Security
The basic functionality of an infrastructure-less network is based on the cooperation of the devices form-
ing the network. To enable wireless communication of devices that are not in direct transmission range,
intermediate nodes act as routers and relay the communication appropriately. In this thesis, we use multi-
hop wireless mobile ad hoc networks based on the IEEE 802.11 standard as particular instantiation of
infrastructure-less networks. Yet, the security mechanisms developed can be adopted to other kinds of
infrastructure-less networks like IEEE 802.16-based mesh networks, sensor networks, or vehicular ad
hoc networks.
1.1.1 Implications of an Infrastructure-less Nature on Security
An infrastructure-less nature as described above brings along manifold implications on network security.
Attacks enabled by the infrastructure-less nature are possible on each layer of the 5-layer model shown in
Figure 1.1, in addition to well-known attacks on infrastructure-based communication systems. Contem-
porary security mechanisms like gateways or firewalls cannot be transferred (without adaptations) from
infrastructure-based networks due to the lack of well-defined network borders that could be protected
by theses mechanisms.
Attacks on the network layer of mobile ad hoc networks are, in general, based on injecting false routing
and/or forwarding information into the network. One particular example of an attack on network layer
is the black hole attack. Comparable to a black hole in terms of astronomy, a black hole in a mobile
ad hoc network attracts and drops network traffic instead of forwarding it to the receiver it is intended
for. The attracting effect is achieved by injecting false routing information that, in terms of the routing
metrics used by the particular routing protocol, makes routes via the black hole appear more attractive
than routes via benign nodes. Due to the severe and well quantifiable effects on network performance,
we use the black hole attack to exemplify misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks in this thesis. However,
the applicability of the security mechanisms developed in this thesis is neither limited to the black hole
attack in particular, nor to attacks on network layer in general.
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1.1.2 State of the Art in Security for Infrastructure-less Networks
Security mechanisms (for mobile ad hoc networks) can be categorized into preventive and reactive
mechanisms. Preventive mechanisms, which are not in the focus of this thesis, are, in general, based
on means of cryptography to prevent false routing/forwarding information from being injected into the
network. Although designed carefully, successful attacks on most preventive security mechanisms are
discovered after a short lifetime.
In case preventive security mechanisms fail, reactive measures must be taken as a second line of de-
fense. For our needs, reactive measures consist of intrusions detection systems combined with intrusion
response mechanisms. In ad hoc networks, intrusion detection on network layer is commonly based on
devices operating in promiscuous mode, monitoring the routing/forwarding behavior of neighbor nodes
in transmission range. This approach was first presented in [65]. Considering the example of a black
hole attack and assuming bidirectional wireless links, a node is able to check whether packets sent to
a neighbor node for further forwarding are relayed correctly. Based on this information, nodes can be
rated as benign or misbehaving. Subsequently, intrusion response mechanisms can be used to exclude
misbehaving nodes from the network. Several schemes for intrusion detection and intrusion response
in mobile ad hoc networks were proposed by now. Of relevance for our work is that mostly, like in
[7, 13, 67], these schemes work in an address-based way. Misbehaving nodes are identified and ex-
cluded from the network based on their network addresses. However, evading address-based solutions
is possible with little effort in a spontaneously established mobile ad hoc network consisting of devices
from different administrative domains that, during operation, are beyond a central control. Also, a mis-
behaving node does not necessarily have to be a logical part of the network, that is, having a network
address is not a requirement for attacking the network. Jamming attacks, as an example, can be per-
formed without having joined the network logically and, thus, can not be thwarted by address-based
intrusion response approaches.
1.2 Decentralized Networks and Security
In client/server systems, Internet browsers and web servers being a prominent example, providers and
consumers of services are strictly separated. Services are provided by central servers and consumed by
clients. In decentralized systems, in contrast, the strict separation of providers and consumers is broken
up. In this thesis, we use peer-to-peer systems as particular instantiation of decentralized systems. Here,
services are offered and consumed in an equal way by the nodes forming the network - the peers.
1.2.1 Implications of a Decentralized Nature on Security
From the perspective of security, waiving central instances means waiving trusted servers on which we
rely for security services such as authentication and access control in centralized networks. Further,
when peer-to-peer systems are established in a spontaneous way, for example, to enable communication
in large-scale disaster scenarios, the availability of security policies defining access rights for restricted
services cannot be assumed.
In general, traditional means for offering authentication and access control like Kerberos [74] are
based on trusted servers and databases containing predefined access rights. As an example, we con-
sider a scenario with a server offering restricted services, a client requesting access to a service, and a
trusted server responsible for deciding on access requests. In this case, the client that requests access
to a restricted service issues this request to the trusted server. If the database storing the access rights
contains a corresponding entry, the trusted server replies with a cryptographipcally signed certificate that
grants access to the requested service. The client then presents this certificate to the server offering the
requested service that, after verifying the authenticity of the certificate, permits access. In peer-to-peer
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systems, without central, trusted instances and security policies, security services cannot be offered this
way. Thus, replacements for both central, trusted instances and security policies are required.
1.2.2 State of the Art in Security for Decentralized Networks
To offer security services in peer-to-peer systems, threshold cryptography can be used as replacement
for central trusted instances. Here, a cryptographic key is distributed among multiple peers. This is
achieved by choosing a polynomial such that it contains the key to be shared. The key shares then
correspond to the polynomial at arbitrary index values (except that of the key itself). This approach was
first presented in [95]. With the key shares, peers are able to produce partial signatures for certificates
that, for example, grant access to restricted resources. By Lagrange interpolation, a full, valid signature
can be computed only if a sufficient number of partial signatures is combined. Thus, no single, possibly
compromised peer is able to decide on security-related requests.
The application of threshold cryptography in peer-to-peer systems (and mobile ad hoc networks) is
well investigated. The foundation was laid in [73], where different threshold signature schemes are
compared with respect to their performance in controlling access to closed user groups within P2P Sys-
tems. Performance is measured in terms of basic operation costs, that is, the time needed to produce
partial signatures, and join time, that is, the amount of time a new peer needs to join a closed user group.
In general, the focus of related work is set on the evaluation of the performance of different threshold
cryptography schemes. Subject of the evaluation are mostly technical metrics such as computing time
required, energy consumed, or data overhead generated. To the best of our knowledge, no attention was
paid so far on how a lack of security policies and the resulting challenges can be overcome.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we address the challenges in offering security in mobile ad hoc networks and peer-to-peer
system mentioned above. We present (1) an intrusion response mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks
that uses the physical location instead of network addresses to identify misbehaving devices and (2)
user-based cooperative decisions in peer-to-peer networks as replacement for central, trusted instances
and security policies.
1.3.1 Location-based Intrusion Response in Infrastructure-less Networks
Using the physical location of devices instead of network addresses, the location-based intrusion response
mechanism we present in this thesis excludes misbehaving devices from the network by establishing
quarantined areas at locations where misbehavior is detected. Benign devices being aware of their quar-
antined location stop communicating as long as they are quarantined. This way, we make quarantined
areas void of communication, thus preventing communication from entering or leaving quarantined ar-
eas. As a consequence, existing routes that cross boundaries of quarantined areas become invalid and,
since also control traffic responsible for establishing new routes neither enters nor leaves quarantined
areas, newly established routes avoid quarantined areas.
For obvious reasons, quarantined areas have to cover at least the transmission/reception range of
devices. Further, the location-based intrusion response is applicable only in scenarios as outlined above,
consisting of a large number of devices, since benign devices located in physical proximity to misbehaving
devices are excluded from the network for the sake of overall network survivability. Existing testbeds
are of a small-scale compared to both the transmission/reception range of devices and the number
of devices they consist of [53]. A testbed-based evaluation of the location-based intrusion response
is, thus, hardly realizable. To evaluate the performance of the location-based intrusion response we,
therefore, combine simulation studies and analytical modeling. This way, we aim at achieving a best
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possible coverage of the parameter space and at proving the results obtained in simulation studies and
by analytical models mutually plausible. Directly comparing an address-based solution with the location-
based intrusion response at the example of a black hole attack, our results show that the location-based
approach is insusceptible to changes in addresses of misbehaving nodes. To evade the location-based
intrusion approach, misbehaving devices have to leave quarantined areas which is physically bounded
by the speed of devices. Although we use the black hole attack to evaluate the performance of the
location-based intrusion response, the applicability is not limited to this particular attack, nor to attacks
on network layer in general. Also attacks on other layers, like tampering with medium access or transport
protocols, once detected and localized, can be thwarted by the location-based intrusion response.
To mitigate the drawback of benign devices being excluded from the network along with misbehaving
devices in close physical proximity, we present two approaches.
First, we apply an adaptive transmission power of devices to reduce the transmission/reception range,
thus minimizing the required size for quarantined areas. Our results based on simulation studies show
that this approach can be used in scenarios with low node mobility to improve the location-based intru-
sion response in terms of benign nodes affected. While in scenarios with a high node mobility, reducing
transmission power still can be used to minimize the number of benign devices affected, the reduced
transmission range causes frequent route breaks. The resulting effects counteract the gain of minimized
quarantined areas and cause a degraded network performance.
As second approach to improve the location-based intrusion response, we harness delay tolerance of
applications to enable delayed communication of quarantined devices. Results obtained in simulation
studies show that we are able to nearly fully recover network functionality in terms of packet loss if we
can accept increased transmission delays.
1.3.2 User-based Cooperative Decisions for Decentralized Networks
To provide security services like authentication and access control in peer-to-peer systems without a
central, trusted instance and security policies, we present tools and interaction schemes for user-based
cooperative decisions. To enforce the cooperation of peers for deciding on security-related requests,
we distribute a cryptographic key by means of threshold cryptography. By involving users directly in a
decision process, we are able to decide on security-related requests in the absence of security policies.
We first review existing threshold cryptography approaches subject to their applicability in our sce-
nario, where we involve users in the decision process. Many threshold cryptography approaches require
that the co-signers are known to each instance that contributes a partial signature before partial signa-
tures can be generated. A peer that is part of a decision process and does not provide its partial signature
then causes the overall decision process to fail. Thus, the unpredictable behavior of users, that is, the
fact that users might not be able to provide a decision in a reasonable time, makes these threshold cryp-
tography approaches unsuitable. We, therefore, require a threshold cryptography scheme that is able to
handle failures of individual peers that are part of a decision process.
When involving users directly in decision processes, we have to keep in mind that the main interests
of users in a disaster scenario are different ones. Thus, the frequency with which one particular user is
involved as well as the overall number of users involved per decision have to be minimized. To achieve
the first, we present different models for the interaction of a peer that issues a security-related request
with the peers that are involved in the decision process. To achieve the latter, we present stochastic
models describing the different interaction schemes, thus serving as tools for minimizing the number
of users involved per decision during system operation. For model validation, we deploy a prototype
for the user-based cooperative decisions in the PlanetLab [80] and the G-Lab [19] testbeds. The results
obtained show the applicability of the interaction schemes and the correctness of the analytical models.
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2 Basics and Related Work on Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
In this chapter, we briefly review foundations of mobile ad hoc networks and basic as well as recent
related work that has motivated our research. For a more comprehensive introduction, we refer to
[31]. We focus on research related to the basic approach for location-based intrusion response. We
present work on attacks and security mechanisms, location-based routing mechanisms and analytical
models for mobile ad hoc networks. We further review work on adaptive transmission power and delay
tolerant communication in mobile ad hoc networks which are the basis for the improvements of the
location-based intrusion response. For a broader overview of security-related challenges, we refer to
[15].
2.1 General Network Model
We consider a mobile ad hoc network that is established in a large-scale disaster scenario. Without loss
of generality, we focus on mobile ad hoc networks established based on the IEEE 802.11 standard.
We assume that any device in the affected area featuring wireless communication capabilities is used
to form the network. This includes devices of affected civilians as well as devices of on-site first respon-
ders and reconstruction units. We assume a resulting network size in the order of 103 nodes. While
the location-based security mechanism developed in the following chapters can be applied to larger
scenarios, it cannot be applied in small-scale scenarios, where routes consist of one or two hops only.
Sophisticated models for mobility patterns of first responders are introduced, for example, in [42, 93].
However, we assume that by establishing a scenario-wide network that consists of devices from different
user groups, the resulting mobility pattern is a random movement. Regarding the security mechanisms
developed, a random mobility can further be assumed as the worst-case.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the benign or malicious behavior of nodes is static. That
is, nodes do not switch between benign and malicious behavior. We further assume that misbehaving
nodes do not take part in the actual communication. A misbehaving node is neither source nor intended
destination of a communication.
Regarding the communication pattern, we focus on unicast communication. However, the security
mechanisms developed can be adapted to multicast and to broadcast communication. We assume that
communication is sparse with respect to the number of nodes, the network consists of.
2.2 Foundations
In the following we present the details of the physical, data link, and network layer of mobile ad hoc
networks required for the remainder of this thesis.
2.2.1 Physical Layer
Details of the physical layer that are of relevance for this thesis are antenna characteristics and models
for wireless signal propagation. For a comprehensive overview, we refer to [103].
To propagate a signal wirelessly, energy has to be transmitted from a sender S to a receiver R. This is
done by electromagnetic waves of a certain power P emitted and received by antennas.
In the simplest case, for an isotropic antenna, the power PS is emitted spherically by the sending
antenna and is, thus, distributed uniformly on the surface Asphere = 4pir2 of the sphere with radius r.
This results in a power density
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Siso =
PS
4pir2
at a distance r from the sending antenna. The power PR received at the receiving antenna now depends
on the effective area of the antenna
Ae f f ,iso =
λ2
4pi
where λ denotes the wavelength of the signal. PR now can be calculated as
PR, f ree,iso = Siso · Ae f f ,iso = Ps4pir2 ·
λ2
4pi
which is a free space model that holds if the main lobe of the antenna is free of obstacles and if the
distance between sender and receiver is small.
Since practical antennas do not emit spherically, but show planar peaks, we obtain an antenna gain GS
at the sender and GR at the receiver for this omnidirectional antenna compared to the isotropic antenna.
The resulting power density at a distance r from the sending antenna is then defined as
Somni =
PS · GS
4pir2
The effective area changes to
Ae f f ,omni =
λ2 · GR
4pi
For an omnidirectional antenna, we, thus, obtain
PR, f ree,omni = Somni · Ae f f ,omni = GS · GR · Ps4pir2 ·
λ2
4pi
which also is a free space model that holds if the main lobe of the antenna is free of obstacles and if
the distance between sender and receiver is small.
We require the models to calculate a reduced transmission power of devices in order to reduce the
size of quarantined areas while keeping the security level as high as possible. Reducing the transmitted
power and, thus, the received power more than required has no negative effect on security. To keep the
complexity of the evaluation on a feasible level for the simulation tool we, therefore, neglect effects of
obstacles that mostly cause an additional signal attenuation.
If the distance between sender and receiver is large, effects of signals reflected from the ground causing
additional attenuation but also amplification have to be considered. The corresponding two ray ground
reflection model describes the power received at the receiver as
PR,twora y = GSGR
PSh
2
Sh
2
R
r4
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where hS and hR denote the height of sender and receiver above the ground.
By setting PR, f ree = PR,twora y and resolving to the distance r between sender and receiver, we obtain
the cross-over distance
rC =
4pihShR
λ
If the distance r between sender and receiver is below rC , effects of ground reflection can be neglected
and the power received at the receiver can be calculated with the free space model.
In our scenario, we assume a communication based on IEEE 802.11 wireless networks operating at
2.4GHz resulting in λ= 0.125m. Further, we assume a height of sender and receiver above ground that
corresponds to devices held at human head level, thus hS ≈ hR ≈ 1.6m. The resulting cross-over distance
is rC ≈ 257m, which is larger than the transmission range of 250m that we assume. For our calculations
in Chapter 4, we, thus, apply the free space model.
2.2.2 Data Link Layer
A core challenge of wireless data transmission is to coordinate access to the wireless medium. In wired
(local area) networks, all devices attached to the wire are able to hear whether an arbitrary device uses
the wired medium. Protocols coordinating access to the medium can be based on a simple check whether
the medium is in use before a transmission is started in combination with a collision detection.
In multi-hop mobile wireless ad hoc networks, this access control scheme is not applicable. If we
consider the topology shown in Figure 2.1, then, due to the limited wireless transmission range, Device
C may sense the medium as free, while Device A uses the medium. If, now, A is transmitting to Device
B that is in transmission range of both A and C , a transmission of C would interfere at B with the
transmission from A. This is commonly known as the hidden terminal problem.
On the other hand, if B is transmitting to A and C wants to transmit to D, C senses the medium as
used although the transmission would not interfere with the transmission of B at A, since A is not in
transmission range of C . This is commonly known as the exposed terminal problem.
Figure 2.1: Exemplary topology of a wireless multi-hop network where the hidden and exposed terminal problems
may occur
A possible way to mitigate these problems is to use a two-way handshake of sender and receiver.
Before starting a data transmission, the sender sends a request to send to the receiver. The request to
send contains an estimate for the time, the transmission will take. The receiver replies with a clear to
send which also contains the estimated transmission time.
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In our example for the hidden terminal problem, if B sends the clear to send to A before A starts its
transmission to B, C will also receive the clear to send. From this, C knows that the medium is busy at B
and that its transmission would interfere with the transmission received at B. This way, an interference
at B due to the hidden terminal problem is avoided.
On the other hand, if B transmits to A and C receives the request to send but not the clear to send,
C knows that its transmission will not interfere with the transmission of B at A. Thus, C may start its
transmission to D in parallel to the transmission of B to A which avoids the exposed terminal problem.
For more detailed information, we refer to [104].
An important implication of the request to send/clear to send medium access control mechanism is
that it results in symmetric wireless links which is the basis for most intrusion detection schemes in
mobile ad hoc networks as we will discuss hereinafter.
More sophisticated medium access control schemes for other types of infrastructure-less networks like
sensor or mesh networks exist. However, these are not of relevance for the contribution of this thesis.
2.2.3 Network Layer
A central challenge regarding the network layer of multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks is to discover
and maintain routes in the potentially constantly changing network topology. A large family of routing
protocols tailored to the infrastructure-less nature were proposed in the last years. For our needs, these
can be categorized into proactive, reactive, and geographic approaches.
Proactive protocols exchange topology information constantly, between all nodes of the network.
Based on this information, routes to arbitrary nodes can be calculated and, if the network is not
partitioned, are readily available when needed. On the downside, exchanging topology information
constantly causes a permanent message overhead that increases along with the network size.
Reactive protocols exchange topology information not unless a route is required. In this case, route
request messages are broadcasted in the network. Based on the path this broadcast follows to reach the
requested node, unicast routes can be established. Since routing information is exchanged only when
a route is required, the overhead can be decreased compared to proactive protocols, in particular, in
large-scale networks with sparse communication.
Geographic routing protocols aim at further limiting the message overhead generated for routing tasks.
This is achieved by restricting broadcast messages to a geographic area where the destination is assumed
to be located. On the downside, geographic approaches may fail if (large) obstacles are located between
source and destination, thus blocking the area to which broadcast messages are restricted.
The location-based intrusion response mechanism developed in this thesis can be adapted to proactive,
reactive, and geographic protocols. Yet, we decided to base the evaluation upon the reactive ad-hoc
on-demand distance vector (AODV) protocol [77] described below. We made this choice in light of
the large-scale application scenario we outlined in Chapter 1. Here, a proactive protocol would cause
a large message overhead also if sophisticated routing protocols that combine proactive and reactive
mechanisms to limit the overhead are deployed [119]. We decided not to use a geographic routing
protocol since this would have side effects on the metrics we use to evaluate the location-based intrusion
response that, itself, introduces aspects of geographic routing.
AODV
We use an implementation of AODV which meets the specifications of RFC3561 [78].
In order to illustrate the details of AODV’s mode of operation that are of relevance for our work, we
assume that a source node S wants to send data to a destination node D for which no route is known
at S. AODV is a reactive routing protocol, which means that a route discovery process is initiated not
unless a route is needed. To discover a route, S generates a route request message r reqSD. Among other
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information, this message contains the network addresses ipS and ipD of source and destination, a hop
count hopS, a destination sequence number sndest , and an originator sequence number snorig .
A sequence number snX is maintained by every node X . For our needs, it is sufficient to say that
sequence numbers are used to indicate the age of routing messages. X increments its own sequence
number snX by one every time it initiates a route request message and uses snX as snorig . Since, in our
example, S has no valid route to D, it has no knowledge about the current sequence number snD of D.
This is indicated by a corresponding flag in r reqSD.
The route request message r reqSD is sent as a broadcast. When a node Y 6= S receives r reqSD via a
node X /∈ {Y,D}, Y checks whether a change of its routing table is necessary. A corresponding entry in Y ’s
routing table states that it can reach node S via node X . The entry contains (besides other information)
the network address of S, the sequence number of S, snS, which is included in r reqSD as snorig , and the
distance in hops to S which is included in r reqSD as hopS. A new entry is created if no entry for S exists
in Y ’s routing table. An update is performed if an entry for S exists with sn′S and hop′S, and snS > sn′S or
snS = sn′S and hopS < hop′S, that is, if the route is newer or shorter. After performing the updates to the
routing table, Y increments hopS by one and forwards r reqSD.
Since sending route requests as broadcast messages causes a high network load, AODV may use an
expanding ring search to mitigate this effect. In this process, routes are first searched in the neighborhood
of the source. For this, the time to live (TTL) of RREQ messages is set appropriately. [78] proposes to
search routes consecutively in the 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, and 7-hop neighborhood of the source. If a route is not
found in these steps, the search is extended to the full network diameter which is assumed to be 35 hops
in [78].
When r reqSD arrives at the destination node D, D generates a route reply message r repDS. Besides
other information, r repDS contains the network addresses of S and D, a hop count hopD, and the des-
tination sequence number sndest . In our example, D uses its current sequence number snD as sndest .
r repDS is sent to S as a unicast message, which is forwarded based on the routing table entries that have
been created while r reqSD traversed the network. Upon receiving r repDS at a node X 6= D, X updates
the entry for D in its routing table in analogy to the update that is performed at X for node S upon
receiving r reqSD. That is, a route is updated if it is newer or shorter. According to this, X will forward
r repDS only if r repDS caused X to update its routing table.
The route from S to D may become invalid. This can happen, for example, because of the mobility
of nodes due to which a node Y via which a node X forwarded messages to D moves out of X ’s trans-
mission range. In this case, X notifies the source node S by sending a route error message rer rD for the
destination node D. Upon receiving rer rD, S may initiate a new route request for D. In this case, the
expanding ring search does not start from the very beginning, but from the ring in which the destination
was found previously.
2.3 Related Work on Attacks on Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
A mobile ad hoc network operates based on the cooperation of nodes that are usually not within the
administrative domain of a service provider, but controlled directly by the end user. This makes it easy
for an attacker to tamper with the behavior of a node in order to launch an attack on the network.
Thus, attack possibilities in mobile ad hoc networks are manifold and exist on each layer of the 5-layer
communication model. A comprehensive review can be found, for example, in [115]. Two mechanisms
that, in combination, form a very effective denial of service attack are the black hole and the Sybil attack.
The black hole attack [115] can be classified as an active attack on the network/routing layer. From
an abstract point of view, a black hole in a mobile ad hoc network is comparable to a black hole in
astronomy. The latter attracts matter and electromagnetic waves (physicists may debate this definition),
while the first attracts data. In both cases, escape from the black hole is not possible. In the networking
context, this means that data which has been attracted by a black hole attacker is dropped instead of
being forwarded to the intended receiver. Further continuing with our analogy, false routing information
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that is injected into a network corresponds to the gravity of the astronomic black hole. With this, a black
hole attacker in a mobile ad hoc network achieves an attracting effect, in that it offers performant routes
in terms of the metrics used by the particular routing protocol. As a result, the black hole is chosen
to be part of a large number of routes. The negative effects of a black hole attack on the reliability
and performance of a mobile ad hoc network are studied, for example, in [37, 1]. The detailed mode
of operation of a black hole attack depends on the particular routing protocol deployed. The specific
behavior used in our studies will be described in Section 3.1.
The concept of the Sybil attack goes back to [92], a book about a woman who suffered from disso-
ciative identity disorder and developed sixteen different personalities during the course of the disease.
By taking this analogy, an attacker that performs a Sybil attack within a networking context presents
itself under different network identities. The purposes of a Sybil attack vary from consuming more net-
work resources than intended for one device/user to the prevention of being detected, traced back, or
penalized by security mechanisms. A Sybil attack can be performed on every layer of the 5-layer model
that deals with identities or addresses. The particular form used in our experiments will be described in
Section 3.1.
2.4 Related Work on Intrusion Prevention in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Preventive security mechanisms such as gateways or firewalls used in wired and infrastructure-based
networks can hardly be applied in mobile ad hoc networks. Thus, preventive security mechanisms in
the context of a mobile ad hoc network mainly appear in the form of secure routing protocols. The
goal of these protocols is to prevent false routing information from being injected into the network and
to avoid the alteration of correct routing information by an adversary. Since the first routing protocols
for mobile ad hoc networks were not designed for security but rather for functionality, injecting false
routing information or altering correct routing information was possible with little effort. This weakness
is exploited for instance by the black hole attack. An overview of secure routing protocols for mobile ad
hoc networks can be found in [38]. In general, the functionality of secure routing protocols is based on
the deployment of cryptographic measures in order to authenticate routing information.
As a precondition, mechanisms for key establishment and for authenticating routing information used
during route discovery are required. A mechanism for key establishment in mobile ad hoc networks
without a central, trusted entity can be found, for example, in [83]. Authenticating routing information
is, in general, based on hash chains. Here, a commonly known secure hash function is applied multiple
times to a seeding value. The result can be included in a data packet along with the seed, which is hashed
at each hop. Using, for example, the maximum time to live of a packet to generate the result of the hash
chain, the correctness of the hop count can be verified at each node. To authenticate the source of a
broadcast, the values of a hash chain can be used as one-time keys to produce message authentication
codes. If keys are released delayed with respect to the message they were used to authenticate, the
authenticity of the sender can be verified. One of the first protocols authenticating broadcast sources
based on hash chains is presented in [79]. Subsequent approaches, such as [43, 112] are designed to
overcome limitations such as relatively high authentication delays and overhead caused in scenarios with
many broadcast sources.
Two specific secure routing protocols are SAODV [117] and Ariadne [39]. These protocols were de-
signed as secure versions of AODV [77] and DSR [48], respectively. Despite being designed carefully,
these protocols were proven to be susceptible to attacks, recently. New attack mechanisms are identi-
fied in [40, 2, 3]. To cope with these, new secure routing protocols and frameworks to mathematically
prove their security are proposed in [2, 3]. Developers of secure routing protocols became cautious
about claiming perfect security of their protocols. Instead, well defined attacker models specify the types
of malicious behavior which can be prevented. Furthermore, secure routing protocols are not able to
thwart attacks on other layers such as jamming attacks on physical layer or attacks on wireless medium
access control protocols. Also, some of the proposed approaches introduce a considerable computa-
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tional and communication overhead that causes negative effects on network performance even when no
misbehaving devices are present.
2.5 Related Work on Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Response in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Intrusion detection systems in combination with intrusion response mechanisms can be deployed as
reactive security measures to establish a second line of defense for the case of subverted preventive
security measures. Intrusion detection systems are able to identify ongoing misbehavior. For this, two
different approaches, anomaly-based and signature-based detection, can be deployed. Anomaly-based
intrusion detection systems ’know’ the normal operational bounds of a network and can classify any
deviation from this as an attack. Signature-based intrusion detection systems ’know’ the characteristic
patterns (signatures) of attack mechanisms and can recognize these. As an example, we will consider
the detection of a black hole attack. In this case, anomaly-based intrusion detection can be based, for
example, on the measurement of the packet loss in a network without misbehaving nodes. If the loss
increases, an anomaly-based system can classify this as a potential attack.
For signature-based detection of a black hole attack, a pattern for this attack behavior has to be speci-
fied. The pattern depends on the particular routing protocol deployed and describes individual facets of
the attack like the injection of false routing information. Both anomaly-based and signature-based ap-
proaches have advantages and disadvantages. However, since our goal is not to design a novel intrusion
detection system for mobile ad hoc networks, a detailed evaluation is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Similar to preventive security measures, intrusion detection systems can not be transferred directly
from wired and infrastructure-based environments. The negative effects of ad hoc routing protocols on
intrusion detection systems that were designed for wired and infrastructure-based networks are shown
in [4]. Thus, new approaches for intrusion detection in mobile ad hoc networks were developed in the
last years.
One of the first approaches for intrusion detection and response in mobile ad hoc networks is presented
in [65]. This anomaly-based system uses a packet loss metric to detect misbehaving nodes. For this, an
intrusion detection component (the watchdog) on each node monitors the forwarding behavior of its
neighbors. If a certain threshold of packet loss is exceeded, the watchdog sends a notification to the
source of the packets. Intrusion response is performed by the pathrater component, which collects
information from the watchdogs, calculates ratings for each node, and sums up these node ratings into
a rating for the route to the destination. In case multiple routes to a destination exist, the pathrater
chooses the one with the best rating for transmission. By doing so, the pathrater prevents the inclusion
of detected malicious nodes in a route.
Subsequent approaches for intrusion detection were developed with the goal of overcoming limita-
tions of the watchdog/pathrater approach and of further taking into account constraints of devices and
harnessing the characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks.
The anomaly-based intrusion detection system proposed in [41] uses a clustering approach to reduce
the system load caused by intrusion detection tasks. For this, one node out of a set of neighboring nodes
(a cluster) is determined as the clusterhead. In each cluster, only the clusterhead is responsible for
intrusion detection. The role of being clusterhead is assigned periodically to different nodes in a cluster.
In [118], a cooperative, anomaly-based intrusion detection system is presented. Here, an exchange
of intrusion detection information among nodes is used to enhance detection performance. With this, it
is possible to lower false positive (a detection when there is no attack) and false negative (no detection
when there is an attack) rates.
A signature-based intrusion detection system for the AODV routing protocol is presented in [107].
The signature of an attack is modeled as a composition of the individual steps which it consists of. Using
finite state machines, an attack is recognized if the state machine consecutively passed through all states,
each of which represents an individual step of an attack.
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An anomaly-based approach for detecting colluding misbehaving nodes is presented in [27]. In con-
trast to the intrusion detection approaches discussed before, the approach is able to deal with hop-by-hop
encrypted wireless links.
Comprehensive approaches that take into account intrusion detection as well as intrusion response
are, for example, CONFIDANT [13], CORE [67], OCEAN [7], Routeguard [32] and AntSec [71, 72, 70].
For each of these, intrusion detection is performed by an anomaly-based component whose core idea
is comparable to the watchdog as proposed in [65]. The information that is gathered by the watchdog
component is collected and managed in a reputation system that is either based on locally available
information only or global information that is exchanged between nodes. The assignment of reputation
values to nodes is based on the addresses of nodes as identifiers in all approaches. Consequently, in-
trusion response is the exclusion of misbehaving nodes with a bad reputation from the network based
on their addresses. Generally speaking, no data is sent to/via or received from/via addresses that are
assigned with a bad reputation.
An approach that is to some extent related to the location-based intrusion response system we develop
and evaluate in the following chapters is TIARA [86]. The authors propose a set of intrusion detection
and intrusion response mechanisms that can be implemented independently from a particular routing
protocol. One part of TIARA describes a distributed wireless firewall in which dynamic filter rules are
enforced by each benign node in the network. Malicious traffic is filtered by the nodes surrounding
the source. This results in a quarantine effect that is comparable to the quarantined areas that are
the fundament for the location-based intrusion response mechanism developed in this thesis. However,
firewall rules are based on network addresses and, thus, are susceptible to Sybil attacks the same way
as other address-based intrusion response systems. An evaluation of the mechanisms proposed is not
presented.
A mechanism for determining geographic abstractions of jammed areas in sensor networks, which
correspond to the quarantined areas we introduce in mobile ad hoc networks, is presented in [114]. The
focus is set on designing and evaluating a distributed protocol for defining the boundaries of jammed
areas properly, when a global information on the location of nodes is not available. Although the ap-
proach was designed for sensor networks, the assumptions made do not prevent applying it in mobile ad
hoc networks. Thus, the approach presented can be used as basis for establishing quarantined areas in
mobile ad hoc networks without global knowledge on the location of nodes.
In [35], a model for the spreading of mobile worms via short distance wireless links of cell phones is
developed. The model is used to calculate quarantine boundaries at which immediate countermeasures
can be taken to stop the spreading. Due to the assumptions made for the network model, the work is not
applicable in our context.
2.6 Related Work on Geographic Routing Protocols for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Several routing mechanisms for mobile ad hoc networks that take into account geographical information
of nodes were proposed. An overview can be found, for example, in [66] or [59]. For our needs, it
is sufficient to understand the basic idea of geographic routing. Thus, we shortly introduce LAR [54]
and DREAM [9], two of the first protocols which are related to our work. Both protocols use location
information to restrict the propagation of broadcast messages in order to reduce routing overhead.
LAR proposes two schemes to improve the overhead of the route discovery phase of on-demand routing
protocols. For the first scheme, a request zone is specified such that it contains the initiator of a route
request and an area in which the destination is expected to be located. Route request messages are
only forwarded by nodes that are situated within the request zone. The second scheme is based on the
distance between the destination and nodes that could potentially forward a route request. Here, a node
only forwards a route request if it is closer (within certain bounds) to the destination than the node it
received the request from.
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DREAM was developed as a robust protocol that sends every message (not only route requests) as a
restricted broadcast. To restrict the broadcast, DREAM determines the direction from sender to receiver
based on their geographical positions. Only nodes that are (within certain bounds) located in this di-
rection forward messages. At this point, it is necessary to mention that the objective of DREAM was the
efficient dissemination of the location information of nodes throughout a network. However, a detailed
description of this process is beyond the scope of this thesis.
A precondition for LAR and DREAM as well as for our approach is that nodes are aware of their
geographical position. One way to determine this would be the use of GPS [22]. Besides this, other
approaches for determining positions in dynamic environments were proposed. A survey can be found
in [99]. The localization mechanisms presented there were developed for sensor networks but can also
be applied to mobile ad hoc networks. Localization techniques include beacon based approaches, in
which landmarks emit position information that can be processed (for example, by triangulation) by
mobile devices. For indoor positioning, badges can be used to support position determination on the
granularity of rooms if triangulation is not feasible. Besides these mechanisms, which in general allow
for determining a globally unique position, approaches were proposed that enable relative positioning of
nodes to each other. Since our approach for location-based intrusion response neither requires globally
available information nor globally unique positioning, most of the localization approaches proposed can
be deployed.
2.7 Related Work on Analytical Models for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
A metric often described analytically is the throughput of mobile ad hoc networks. One of the first models
for this is presented in [30]. The authors develop an upper bound for per node throughput subject to
the total number of nodes in the network and subject to the theoretical transmission speed of devices.
[30] served as basis for several further studies on the throughput of mobile ad hoc networks. In [49],
the influence of the transmission range on the upper bound proposed in [30] is described. An analysis
of the effect of different traffic patterns is performed in [60]. The impact of node mobility is described
in [29]. In [20], network coding is considered as a means to increase per node throughput.
The end-to-end delay in mobile ad hoc networks subject to the number of nodes and to node mobility
is modeled in [28]. Closely related to the delay are the length (geographical distance of sender and
receiver) and the lifetime (time until nodes move out of each others transmission range) of single-hop
links and multi-hop routes. A model for the length of single-hop links for a uniform as well as for
a Gaussian distribution of node locations is proposed in [69]. The route length for a uniform node
distribution is described in [36]. The lifetime of single-hop links subject to node mobility is analyzed in
[89]. In [5], analytical models for the lifetime of multi-hop routes are developed for different mobility
models. In [108] the lifetime of single-hop routes is modeled for different mobility patterns.
Recently, game theory found its way into research on mobile ad hoc networks. From an abstract point
of view, game theory is a tool for modeling give-and-take interactions of two parties. In [68], an analysis
of the CORE intrusion detection and response system [67] based on game theory is presented. In [100],
the authors propose game theoretic views on issues such as transmission power control, medium access
strategies, and packet forwarding. A model based on game theory for misbehavior in mobile ad hoc
networks is the focus of [106]. Closely related to this is the work in [46]. Here, a reputation mechanism
used to decide on whether to interact with a node or not (that is, relaying its packets or using it as a
relay) is developed based on game theory. Since our work is not aimed at describing the interaction of
two particular nodes, we did not choose game theory as basis for our models.
To the best of our knowledge, [36] is the only work that describes the effects of node misbehavior
in mobile ad hoc networks by means of a geographical model. However, it focuses on the route-length
distribution as a metric only and does neither include modeling of packet loss nor of security mechanisms.
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2.8 Related Work on Adaptive Transmission Power in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Adaptive transmission power has a wide range of applications in wireless networks. Saving battery power
or signal strength control for CDMA-based systems are prominent examples. In mobile ad hoc networks,
adaptive transmission power is mainly used for controlling and optimizing the network topology. Algo-
rithms differ in their constraints (for example, node degree, throughput) subject to which an optimal
transmission power shall be achieved. A further distinction can be made regarding a network-global or
a per node adaptation of the transmission power (that is, whether all nodes use the same transmission
power or each node uses an individual value). Also the overhead generated (in terms of messages) to
coordinate the use of an adaptive transmission power between individual nodes categorizes the existing
algorithms.
One of the first approaches of power aware routing in mobile ad hoc networks is proposed in [97].
Metrics for optimal routing with respect to energy consumed are specified and validated by simula-
tion. Yet, a direct adaptation of the transmission power is not considered. In previous and subsequent
works, the authors also address energy awareness for medium access and transport layer protocols not
specifically related to mobile ad hoc networks.
Distributed heuristics for topology control without the necessity to exchange additional control in-
formation are proposed in [85]. The algorithms are based on information that is available by routing
protocols. Thus, no additional information has to be exchanged. Power is adapted on a per-node basis.
Variations for link state and distance vector protocols are described.
A distributed protocol for topology control in order to achieve a connected network by adapting trans-
mission power such that an optimal number of neighbors per node is maintained is proposed in [10]. In
contrast to [85], control messages are needed.
Algorithms for adaptive network-global as well as individual transmission power in mobile ad hoc net-
works with the goal of achieving a maximized throughput (not minimal energy) subject to the network
load and the network density (nodes per area) are proposed in [75]. No additional messages are needed,
but, for individual transmission power, the IEEE 802.11 protocol is extended to prevent asymmetry. An
analytical model for the algorithms is proposed in [76]. A protocol that can be used as an addition to
other (non-power-aware routing protocols) is proposed in [25]. The protocol redirects communication
between adjacent nodes by introducing additional forwarding nodes. This way, the overall transmission
power required in a route is minimized. Control messages are needed to manage the redirection. Ana-
lytical models for the comparison of static and adaptive transmission power considering mobility during
route discovery as well as route maintenance phases have been formulated and analyzed in [24].
A protocol for maximizing network lifetime by adaptive transmission power on a per-node basis is
proposed in [98]. The algorithm works in a distributed way and, for this, requires the exchange of
corresponding protocol messages.
To the best of our knowledge, no related work exists that utilizes an adaptive transmission power in
the context of location-based security mechanisms for mobile ad hoc networks.
2.9 Related Work on Delay Tolerant Communication in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Several approaches to enable delay (or disruption) tolerant communication were proposed in literature.
Out of these, we discuss performance enhancing proxies [12], the Licklider Transmission Protocol [84],
and the Bundle Protocol [94] for potential deployment in our scenario.
Performance enhancing proxies, in general, split up connections into different sections each of which
is optimized for the individual conditions of the corresponding network segment. Implementations exist
on transport and application layer of the 5-layer model. A well known example for a performance
enhancing proxy on application layer is a proxy server for web browsing. Examples for proxied variants
of TCP include snoop TCP [6] and Freeze-TCP [23]. TCP proxies adapt TCP to the conditions in wireless
environments in order to deal with lossy wireless channels and periodic disconnections.
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The Licklider Transmission Protocol and the Bundle Protocol were proposed by IRTF’s Delay Tolerant
Networking Research Group to enable efficient communication in disruptive environments as, for exam-
ple, interplanetary networks. The Licklider Protocol is implemented above the data link layer and, thus,
is designed to operate over one-hop wireless links with very high delays in the scale of minutes up to
hours. The Bundle Protocol works on an additional layer between transport and application layer. In
a store-and-forward manner, it takes data from application layer and uses common transport protocols
like TCP or UDP to transmit the data (possibly over multiple hops) to the receiver intended, as soon as
the next hop in this direction is reachable. Together, the Licklider Protocol and the Bundle Protocol form
a delay tolerant network stack, where the Licklider Protocol is responsible for a reliable communication
between adjacent nodes, and the Bundle Protocol provides end-to-end transmission.
Security issues of delay tolerant networks are studied in [14]. The authors scrutinize the inherent
resistance to attacks that comes along with disruption tolerant networking techniques.
2.9 Related Work on Delay Tolerant Communication in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 17

3 Location-based Intrusion Response in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
In this chapter, we present the basic version of location-based intrusion response in mobile ad hoc
networks. Figure 3.1 shows a schematic representation of the mode of operation. By establishing
quarantined areas void of communication at locations where misbehavior was detected, we exclude
misbehaving nodes from the network. This way, the functionality of the intrusion response mechanism
does not depend on network addresses, which can be changed with little effort in an environment that
is beyond a central control.
Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of the location-based intrusion response. Please note that for reasons of
clarity the transmission/reception range is not shown for each device.
We compare the performance of the location-based intrusion response to an address-based approach
using the example of a combined black hole and Sybil attack on a mobile ad hoc network. The com-
parison is based on a series of simulation studies. For key metrics describing the performance of the
location-based approach, such as the packet loss that is caused by black holes, we further present an
analytical model and mutually validate model predictions and simulation results. We start this chapter
with a description of the relevant details of the system architecture.
3.1 Architecture
In this section, we present details of the design of the attacks, the location service, the intrusion detection
system, and the address-based and the location-based intrusion response mechanisms.
3.1.1 The Black Hole Attack
We realized the black hole behavior outlined in Section 2.3 for the routing protocol AODV described in
Section 2.2.3. The detailed mode of operation of a black hole B can be summarized as follows:
• B answers each route request message r reqSD with B 6= S it receives.
• B claims that the intended destination D is its direct neighbor, that is, B generates a route reply
message r repDS with hopD = 1. This is the first step towards achieving the attracting effect as
described in Section 2.3. If the route that is offered by B appears to be shorter (measured in hops)
than the route offered by D, B’s route will be chosen by S according to the specifications of AODV.
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• B increments its local sequence number snD for the intended destination D by one every time it
receives a route request r reqSD. B uses this sequence number as sndest when it generates r repDS.
This is the second step towards achieving the attracting effect. From route requests r reqDX that
are issued by D for an arbitrary destination X , B learns the current sequence number of D. With
this sequence number, D will answer incoming route requests. Since B increments this sequence
number when answering a route request on behalf of D, the route offered by B will appear to be
newer than the route offered by D. Thus, the route offered by B will be chosen by S.
• B does not forward packets.
3.1.2 The Sybil Attack
To achieve a Sybil behavior, we extended the definition of a black hole B described above as follows:
• B changes its network layer address ipB,n at a Sybil frequency fs y b.
• B keeps track of its previous addresses¦
ipB,1, ..., ipB,n−1
©
With this, B is still able to handle (that is, drop) messages that it receives due to a previously
generated route reply for which B used the address
ipB,x ∈
¦
ipB,1, ..., ipB,n−1
©
• B chooses its addresses ipB,1, ..., ipB,n such that no address appears more than once during a simu-
lation to avoid address conflicts. That is, at the end of the simulation¦
ipB,1, ..., ipB,n
©∩ ¦ipX ,1, ..., ipX ,n©= ;
applies for an arbitrary node X 6= B.
3.1.3 The Location Service
To determine the location of nodes, we implemented a location service that offers each node the possi-
bility to ask for the location of any node in the network. The service is based on the global and exact
knowledge of positions we have in our simulation tool.
The globally available and globally unique position information as it is provided by the location service
is not a precondition for the location-based intrusion response, but was chosen to reduce the complexity
of the implementation. The location-based approach can operate on location information that is only
available locally, in the neighborhood of a misbehaving node, since quarantined areas are managed on
a per node basis and not globally for the network. We describe this in more detail in Section 3.1.6.
Thus, all of the localization approaches we outlined in Section 2.6 could be deployed in a real-world
implementation.
3.1.4 The Intrusion Detection System
For detection of the combined black hole/Sybil attack, we use an anomaly-based approach. Detection
is based on the rate at which a node drops packets that should have been forwarded. Our system is
comparable to the one presented in [118], albeit it works on quite an abstract level. Here it is important
to note that our goal is not the design and evaluation of a new intrusion detection system, but of the
location-based intrusion response mechanism. Thus, we implemented an intrusion detection system that
makes use of the bird’s eye view that is available in our simulation tool. However, the intrusion detection
system is tunable to adjust detection performance (detection speed, true/false positives/negatives) to
that of real-world intrusion detection systems. For this, our intrusion detection system works in the
following steps.
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• Monitoring: During a monitoring interval tmon, a node X collects information about the forward-
ing characteristics of its neighbors. We call a node Y a neighbor of a node X if X is within the
transmission range of Y . For each of its neighbors, X maintains a counter nY,rec for packets that
Y received from another neighbor of X or from X itself for forwarding. A second counter nY, f orw
is maintained for packets that Y forwarded to another neighbor Z or to X itself. Regarding the
abstraction mentioned above, monitoring is not implemented in detail on the medium access layer
of nodes as it is necessary in a real system, but based on the globally available knowledge about
the forwarding behavior of nodes in the simulation environment.
• Classification: After each monitoring interval tmon, X calculates a rating rX ,Y that describes the
forwarding behavior for each of its neighbors Y . We use a weighting factor wbal ≥ 1 to balance
the counters nY,rec and nY, f orw. This way, we prevent false positives if packets are dropped due to
inherent network conditions such as collisions or exhausted queuing space. wbal packets that are
forwarded correctly outbalance one dropped packet. With this, rX ,Y is calculated as
rX ,Y =max

nY,rec − nY, f orwwbal + r
′
X ,Y , rmax

where r ′X ,Y denotes the previous rating that X calculated for Y and rmax denotes a maximum
node rating used to prevent that benign nodes are excluded permanently from the network due to
repeated false positive detections. If rX ,Y exceeds a certain threshold value thresblack, X classifies
Y as a black hole.
Similar to OCEAN [7], our intrusion detection system works on a per node basis. No information about
the calculated ratings is exchanged between nodes. Although detection performance can be increased
when nodes act cooperatively, the evaluation of OCEAN showed that feasible results can be achieved
when only local information is considered. Also for a real system we would preferably use a local
detection, since it avoids the overhead of exchanging and authenticating intrusion detection information.
3.1.5 The Address-based Intrusion Response Mechanism
We designed the address-based intrusion response strategy such that a node Y , which was classified as
a black hole by a node X based on the rating rX ,Y , is excluded from the network based on its (current)
network layer address ipY,n. For this, X does not send/accept any packets to/from ipY,n. If X is part of
a route from a Source S to a Destination D, for which Y was X ’s next hop, X will inform S by sending a
corresponding route error message rer rD.
3.1.6 The Location-based Intrusion Response Mechanism
In contrast to the address-based intrusion response mechanisms, the location-based approach excludes
an identified black hole based on its location. If a node B is classified as a black hole by a node X based
on the rating rX ,B, X obtains B’s location from the location service and establishes a quarantined area
with radius dquar at B’s location. If X is situated within the quarantined area, it will not forward any
messages. If, in this case, X is part of a route from a source S to a destination D, X will inform S by
sending a corresponding route error message rer rD.
Since X will not forward any messages while it is quarantined, route request messages that are usually
sent as broadcast messages will not reach the black hole B, as shown in Figure 3.2. Thus, we prevent B
from being a part of newly established routes while it is quarantined. This effect is comparable to the
restriction of broadcast messages as used by the location-based routing protocols LAR [54] and DREAM
[9].
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Figure 3.2: Restricted broadcast of Route Request Messages in the location-based intrusion response
We assume that a tracking of B is not possible within a quarantined area. Therefore, an adaptation of
the quarantined area when B moves is not possible. For this reason, a quarantined area is revoked after
the period t reset . If B leaves the quarantined area, it may again become part of routes and drop packets.
B is then classified as a black hole again and a new quarantined area is established.
Although we chose AODV as basis for our evaluation, the location-based intrusion response is neither
bound to AODV in particular, nor to reactive routing protocols in common. Proactive routing protocols
are, in general, based on constantly disseminating topology information in the network. From this, nodes
can deduce global topology information based on which routes can be calculated. When used together
with proactive protocols, instead of preventing routing information from entering a quarantined area
as it is done for AODV, the location-based approach would prevent proactive routing information from
leaving a quarantined area. As a result, falsified routing information as it would be generated by a black
hole node is restricted to a quarantined area and kept away from other parts of the network.
3.1.7 Implementation Details
We integrated the components described above in the JiST/MobNet simulation tool as presented in [56].
JiST/MobNet is based on the JiST/SWANS simulation tool [8] tailored to mobile ad hoc networks, which
was reorganized and extended at our institute. Besides other functionality, we added the attacks and
security mechanisms described previously.
Figure 3.3 depicts the interaction of the different components schematically. We implemented the
attacks and the intrusion response mechanisms in a realistic way, as we would for deployment in a real-
world mobile ad hoc network. To keep the implementation effort on an affordable level, the location
service and the intrusion detection system are implemented based on the bird’s eye view that is available
in the simulation tool.
3.2 Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation of the location-based approach for intrusion response. For this,
we follow the methodology proposed by Jain [45].
3.2.1 Goals of the Evaluation
Goal of the evaluation is to compare the performance of the location-based intrusion response with an
address-based approach when confronted with a combined black hole/Sybil attack as described in the
previous section. We state to what extend the intrusion response mechanisms are able to recover network
functionality. As baseline, we use the performance of a network without misbehaving nodes.
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Figure 3.3: Interaction of the components in the simulation tool
3.2.2 Services of the System
The system evaluated is a mobile ad hoc network built upon the following protocols.
• Physical and data link layer: IEEE 802.11 DCF based on the request to send/clear to send hand-
shake to coordinate medium access as described in Section 2.2.2. Thus, bidirectional wireless links
can be assumed for intrusion detection.
• Network layer: IPv4 with AODV routing service and intrusion detection as well as address-based
and location-based intrusion response as described in Section 3.1.
• Transport layer: UDP
In addition, to determine the location of nodes, the location service described in Section 3.1.3 is
available.
3.2.3 Metrics for the Evaluation
As metrics to evaluate the performance of the intrusion response mechanisms, we use
• the packet loss caused by black holes as metric which eliminates all side effects that cannot be
directly associated with the black hole attack,
• the inherent packet loss of the network, which, as further metrics, includes (1) the packet loss
caused by collisions on the wireless medium which may occur despite the request to send/clear
to send handshake in case two nodes start transmitting simultaneously, (2) the packet loss caused
by exhausted queuing space in the network interface, and (3) the packet loss caused by the AODV
protocol due to route breaks or unavailable destinations,
• the packet loss caused by intrusion response, which is the sum of the packet loss caused by a route
break triggered by intrusion response and, for the case of location-based intrusion response, the
packet loss caused if source or destination are quarantined when data has to be transmitted,
• the performance of the intrusion response system in terms of (1) the detection rate measured in
correct detections per monitoring interval in relation to the number of all misbehaving nodes in
radio range of the monitoring node and (2) the false positive rate measured in detections when
there is no attack in relation to correct detections per monitoring interval,
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• the overall packet loss in the network as sum of all loss metrics described above,
• the overall packet delivery ratio to double-check for unrecognized packet loss,
• the average route length measured in hops to identify partitioning effects in the network,
• the transmission delay from sending application to receiving application consisting of (1) the rout-
ing delay on the source node and (2) the propagation delay of the network, to quantify the temporal
side-effects of quarantined areas that have to be bypassed.
3.2.4 Parameters of the System
A multitude of parameters affect the behavior and the performance of the mobile ad hoc network that is
the system under test. For the network itself, these parameters include basic settings such as transmission
power of single nodes, antenna characteristics, traffic patterns, or mobility models, which we will specify
in the experimental design described below. Additional parameters for the Sybil attack, the location
service, the intrusion detection system, and the intrusion response mechanisms are set as introduced in
Section 3.1.
3.2.5 Selection of the Factors for the Evaluation
From the large number of parameters that characterize the network, we choose the following set of
factors that affect network performance subject to the metrics described above significantly. We consider
• the number of malicious nodes in the network,
• the Sybil frequency fs y b at which a malicious node changes its network layer address,
• the interval t reset after which quarantined areas are revoked.
3.2.6 Evaluation Technique
We evaluate the performance of the location-based intrusion response by means of simulation. For this,
we use the simulation tool described in Section 3.1.7.
To improve runtime, we use a Condor cluster [105] to distribute simulation runs on multiple proces-
sors.
3.2.7 Workload of the System
We chose the parameters and factors described above such that we achieve a moderately loaded network,
that is, the network operates in a non-congested state. In light of our application scenario outlined in
Chapter 1, we selected mobility of the nodes to correspond to pedestrian speed. With this, we achieve a
reasonable lifetime of routes and, thus, a feasible overhead of control traffic subject to data traffic.
3.2.8 Experimental Design
Based on preliminary simulations, we defined the parameters and factors used for the evaluation such
that the system operates within normal bounds.
Parameters
The basic parameters of the network are shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Basic network parameters as used in the simulation studies
Number of nodes 1000
Antenna gain G 0dB
Transmission power PS 7dB
Reception threshold PR,min −81dB
Signal wavelength λ 2.4GHz
Resulting transmission range ≈ 250m
Network density ≈ 7.5 neighbors per node in order to typically
achieve a connected network
Resulting simulation area Square with 4750m side length
Traffic pattern Constant bitrate traffic with streams of 2048
bytes per second split in 4 packets per second.
20 streams run in parallel with a duration of
30 seconds each. Streams are set up uniformly
within the first 30 seconds of simulated time. Af-
ter this, every time a stream ends, a new one is
created immediately. Source and destination are
randomly selected from the set of benign nodes,
resulting in that malicious nodes are not chosen
as source or destination.
Node Placement Geometrically uniformly distributed random
placement
Mobility model Random waypoint mobility as described in [48]
with minimum speed of 1 meter per second and
maximum speed of 2 meters per second. Nodes
move continuously; upon arrival at a waypoint, a
new waypoint is chosen and movement is contin-
ued immediately.
For the intrusion detection system, we chose the parameters shown in Table 3.2, resulting in a de-
tection performance that has the same order of magnitude as the results presented in [118] if all other
parameters are defined as described above. For other conditions, the intrusion detection system would
have to be adapted appropriately. However, since we focus on evaluating the intrusion response mech-
anisms, a detailed evaluation of the intrusion detection system is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus,
parameters are chosen such that we obtain reasonable operational bounds of the intrusion detection
system, which are the same for the address-based and the location-based intrusion response mechanisms
to guarantee equal preconditions for the evaluation.
Table 3.2: Parameters of the intrusion detection system as used in the simulation studies
Monitoring interval tmon 1s
Weighting factor wbalance 1
Rating limit rmax 30
Detection threshold thresblack 10
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The radius of quarantined areas for location-based intrusion response is set to dquar = 250m, which
corresponds to the transmission/reception range of nodes. We decided to keep this parameter fixed
for now. A smaller quarantine radius would result in route request messages reaching malicious nodes
and is, therefore, not feasible. When we increase the radius of quarantined areas, we get a buffer
for mobility of a malicious node as well as for positioning inaccuracy in realistic systems. But, since
the quarantined area increases proportionally to the square of the radius, an increased radius could
(especially in scenarios with multiple malicious nodes) quickly lead to a partitioned network, which is
clearly not our intention. Yet, we will consider a variable radius of quarantined areas together with an
adaptive transmission power of devices in Chapter 4.
Factors
The factors considered in the simulation studies are shown in Table 3.3. We performed a full-factorial
simulation study in which we simulated each combination for one hour simulated time split up in 6 parts
with 10 minutes each to distribute workload and reduce unwanted side-effects of the random waypoint
mobility model.
Table 3.3: Factors as used in the simulation studies
Number of misbehaving nodes out
of all nodes
1, 2, 3, 5, 10
Sybil frequency fs y b in address
changes per second
1
60
, 1
45
, 1
30
, 1
20
, 1
15
, 1
10
, 1
5
, 1
3
, 1
2
, 1
Time t reset in seconds after which
quarantined areas are revoked
15, 30, 45, 60, 90, 120, 180, 300, 420, 600
3.2.9 Analysis of the Results
Within this section, we present and interpret the results of our simulation studies. For each metric
introduced above, we compare the results (1) for a network without intrusion detection and response
subject to the number of misbehaving nodes, (2) for address-based intrusion response subject to the
number of misbehaving nodes and subject to the Sybil frequency, and (3) for location-based intrusion
response subject to the number of misbehaving nodes and subject to the time after which quarantined
areas are revoked. Since the Sybil attack did not show any significant effects on the location-based
intrusion response, we do not present the results obtained for the location-based approach subject to
the Sybil frequency. All of the following plots are shown with 95% confidence intervals. Note that for
reasons of clarity, not all combinations of the full factorial evaluation are presented.
Packet Loss Caused by Black Holes
Figure 3.4a shows the packet loss that is caused by the black hole nodes in a defenseless network subject
to the number of black holes. A packet loss of more than 60% for one black hole going up to around
90% for 10 black holes (only 1% of all nodes) illustrates the severe effect of the black hole attack on the
availability of the network.
The loss caused by the combined black hole/Sybil attack when the network is defended by address-
based or location-based intrusion response is shown in Figures 3.4b and 3.4c, respectively. The address-
based solution works efficiently for low Sybil frequencies, that is, if misbehaving nodes do not change
addresses. In this case, the loss caused by black hole can be reduced, for example, for the scenario with
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Figure 3.4: Packet loss caused by black holes
10 black holes to about 10%. As soon as misbehaving nodes increase the Sybil frequency, the protection
of the address-based solution decreases. For one address change per second, the loss increases to about
50%.
The performance of the location-based intrusion response depends on appropriate choices of the inter-
val after which quarantined areas are revoked. If this interval is chosen too short, the quarantined area
does not protect the new route discovery process after a route affected by misbehavior was interrupted.
If the quarantine time is chosen appropriately, the location-based approach achieves a performance com-
parable to the address-based solution. That is, the loss caused by black holes can be reduced to about
10% in the scenario with 10 black holes.
At this point, we have to emphasize that the Sybil frequency is part of the misbehavior and will be
optimized by a potential attacker to achieve high loss rates. The quarantine time, on the other hand, is
part of the intrusion response and can be controlled in order to recover network performance.
Packet Loss Caused by Inherent Network Properties
Figure 3.5a shows the inherent loss in a defenseless network caused by collisions on the wireless medium,
exhausted queuing space in the network interfaces, and route breaks due to node mobility as well as
unreachable destinations. It stands out that the inherent loss decreases significantly if the number of
misbehaving nodes increases. To explain this effect, we have to consider the route length subject to
the number of misbehaving nodes presented in Figure 3.14a. We see that the length of the routes over
which packets can be transmitted successfully decreases if the number of misbehaving nodes increases.
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Figure 3.5: Packet loss caused by inherent network properties
Now, since the probability for packet collisions and route breaks is lower for shorter routes, as shown in
Figures 3.6a and 3.8a, the inherent packet loss decreases if the number of misbehaving nodes increases.
Also, as shown in Figure 3.7a, the probability for exhausting queuing space decreases if the number
of misbehaving nodes increases. This can again be explained by the decreasing route length. If route
length decreases, the probability for a route being used by multiple streams in parallel decreases. Thus,
the traffic transmitted over a particular route and the queuing space required decreases.
Since the protection of the address-based approach decreases if the Sybil frequency increases, the
route length decreases as shown in Figure 3.14b. Thus, for reasons similar to those described above, the
inherent packet loss decreases if the Sybil frequency increases. Since the loss caused by one black hole
increases only slightly, as shown in Figure 3.4b, the inherent packet loss does not show any significant
variations subject to the Sybil frequency in this case. The interpretation is supported by the packet loss
caused by collisions on the wireless medium shown in Figure 3.6b, the packet loss caused by exhausted
queuing space in the network interface shown in Figure 3.7b, and the packet loss caused by AODV
due to route breaks or unavailable destinations shown in Figure 3.8b. All of these metrics show effects
comparable to those of an unprotected network described above.
For the location-based intrusion response, the packet loss caused by inherent network properties does
not show significant variations subject to the number of misbehaving nodes as well as subject to the
quarantine time, as shown in Figure 3.5c. This can be explained by the fact that the packet loss caused
by black holes in a network with location-based intrusion response only shows small variations subject
to the number of misbehaving nodes as well as subject to the quarantine time as shown in Figure 3.4c.
Also the route length for a network with location-based intrusion response varies only slightly, as shown
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Figure 3.6: Packet loss caused by collisions on the wireless medium
in Figure 3.14c, which supports the interpretation. Only the packet loss caused by collisions on the
wireless medium presented in Figure 3.6c shows partially significant variations that correlate to the
minor variations in route length.
Altogether, the effects we observed for the packet loss caused by inherent network properties, viewed
together with the route length, support the interpretation that the address-based intrusion response
mechanism can be circumvented by changing addresses.
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Figure 3.7: Packet loss caused by exhausted queuing space in the network interface
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Figure 3.8: Packet loss caused by the AODV routing protocol
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Packet Loss Caused by and Performance of Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Response
As loss caused by the intrusion response system, we consider packets that are not forwarded by a benign
node because, otherwise, they would reach a (detected) misbehaving node.
In case of the location-based intrusion response, if a route crosses the boundaries of a quarantined
area, the route is interrupted by the first quarantined node. A corresponding route error message is sent
to the source. During the time the route error messages takes to reach the source, the source still sends
packets using the meanwhile interrupted route. In the first version of location-based intrusion response
evaluated here, these packets are dropped by the quarantined node that interrupted the route. Further,
if a quarantined node itself has data ready to send, the data is dropped while the node is quarantined.
We will discuss a possibility to avoid these reasons for packet loss in Chapter 5. Yet, for now, we charge
this loss to the intrusion response system.
In case of the address-based intrusion response, if a route contains a node with an address associated
to misbehavior, the node that would have to forward packets to this address interrupts the route. Now,
packet loss charged to the address-based intrusion response occurs for reasons similar to those described
for location-based intrusion response.
Figure 3.9 shows the resulting packet loss for both alternatives for intrusion response. For the address-
based approach, shown in Figure 3.9a, the packet loss caused by intrusion response correlates to the
packet loss caused by black holes. The loss increases along with the number of misbehaving nodes and
along with the Sybil frequency. Both a higher number of misbehaving nodes and faster changes in ad-
dresses of misbehaving nodes lead to an increased number of detections required to exclude misbehaving
nodes and, thus, to an increased packet loss caused by intrusion response.
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Figure 3.9: Packet loss caused by intrusion response
For the location-based intrusion response, shown in Figure 3.9b, the packet loss caused by intrusion
response also correlates to the loss caused by black holes. Yet, as observed for the loss caused by inherent
network properties and for similar reasons, the variations are less significant than for the address-based
approach. Regarding the number of misbehaving nodes, the packet loss caused by location-based intru-
sion response increases proportionally from the scenario with one black hole to the scenario with 5 black
holes. From 5 to 10 black holes, we observe a reduced growth factor, which can be explained by the fact
that the probability for quarantined areas to overlap each other increases along with the number of mis-
behaving nodes. If quarantined areas overlap, the number of affected benign nodes per quarantined area
decreases. Thus, the loss caused if quarantined benign nodes have data ready to send is also reduced.
Comparing the loss caused by the address-based approach and the location-based solution, it stands
out that, in particular in scenarios with multiple misbehaving nodes, the address-based solution clearly
outperforms the location-based approach. This is due to the fact that for the address-based approach
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loss occurs only due to routes that have to be interrupted. For the location-based solution, loss occurs,
in addition, if quarantined benign nodes have data ready to send. However, in contrast to the the loss
caused by black holes, the loss caused by intrusion response is in our hands. We will present approaches
on improving this aspect of the location-based intrusion response in the following chapters.
To be sure that equal preconditions regarding intrusion detection apply for both address-based and
location-based intrusion response, we monitored the performance of the intrusion detection system in
terms of detection rate and false positive rate, as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11.
 0.9986
 0.9988
 0.999
 0.9992
 0.9994
 0.9996
 0.9998
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
D
et
ec
tio
n 
ra
te
Sybil frequency (Hz)
1 black hole
5 black holes
10 black holes
(a) Address-based intrusion response
 0.9986
 0.9988
 0.999
 0.9992
 0.9994
 0.9996
 0.9998
 1
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
D
et
ec
tio
n 
ra
te
Quarantine time (sec)
1 black hole
5 black holes
10 black holes
(b) Location-based intrusion response
Figure 3.10: Detection rate of the intrusion detection system
Regarding the detection rate, we observe a slightly reduced performance for the location-based ap-
proach in a scenario with 10 black holes. Note that this effect is not of statistical significance and the
detection rate still is above 99.9%. To explain the small deviation, we have to recall that the detection
rate is calculated as correct detections subject to possible detections per monitoring interval. If we now
consider that quarantined areas may overlap in scenarios with multiple misbehaving nodes (and, in ad-
dition, false positives may occur, further increasing the number of quarantined areas), a case may occur
where a misbehaving node is fully quarantined without being detected. In this case, a seperate detection
of this misbehaving node is not possible but, also, not required. Still, this rare effect is charged as a
failure of intrusion detection.
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Figure 3.11: False positive rate of the intrusion detection system
Regarding the false positive rate, we observe outliers in scenarios with one misbehaving node for both
address-based and location-based intrusion response. Note that this effect is again not of statistical sig-
3.2 Evaluation 33
nificance and the performance of the intrusion detection system remains in the same order of magnitude
for both address-based and location-based intrusion response. The effect can be explained by the fact
that the inherent packet loss is higher for scenarios with one misbehaving nodes than for scenarios with
multiple misbehaving nodes as shown in Figure 3.5. The intrusion detection system does not differenti-
ate between packets that are not forwarded due to misbehavior and packets that are not forwarded due
to inherent network conditions. Thus, a high loss due to inherent network conditions may lead to false
positive detections.
Overall Packet Loss and Delivery Ratios
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Figure 3.12: Overall packet loss
The overall packet loss as sum of (1) the loss caused by black holes, (2) the packet loss caused by
inherent network properties, and (3) the packet loss caused by intrusion response is shown in Figure
3.12. To interpret the results, we have to recall that the Sybil frequency is part of the misbehavior and
can be optimized by a potential attacker in order to maximize the impact of the attack, thus, in the
particular case of a black hole attack, to maximize packet loss in the network. The quarantine time, on
the other hand, is part of the intrusion response system and can be optimized to minimize the impact
of misbehavior. Comparing the corresponding results, we see that the location-based intrusion response
clearly outperforms the address-based solution. As an example, for a scenario with 10 misbehaving
nodes, we observe an overall packet loss of more than 90% in a defenseless network as shown in Figure
3.12a. If we consider a maximized attack performance for a Sybil frequency of one address change
per second, the overall loss can be reduced to about 60% with the address-based intrusion response.
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For an optimal choice of the quarantine time, the overall loss can be reduced to about 30% for the
location-based approach.
We further have to remember that a considerable part of the overall loss observed for the location-
based intrusion response is the loss caused by intrusion response itself which is still under control of the
intrusion response system. To improve the location-based approach we, thus, focus on reducing this loss
in Chapters 4 and 5.
To verify the correctness of the overall loss, we present the delivery ratio observed in the network
in Figure 3.13. Note that, in the simulation tool used for the evaluation, packet delivery is monitored
separately, independent from packet loss. Failures in the measurement of the packet loss would, thus,
be recognizable in the delivery ratio. Since the delivery ratios match the overall packet loss, we as-
sume correctness of the implemented monitoring architecture as well as completeness of the loss metrics
considered.
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Figure 3.13: Overall delivery ratio
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Route Lengths
The length of routes over which packets can be transmitted successfully, without being affected by mis-
behaving nodes, can be directly used to identify whether and to what extent a network is partitioned.
Considering a defenseless network, shown in Figure 3.14a, we see that the route length decreases signif-
icantly if we increase the number of misbehaving nodes. In a network without misbehaving nodes, we
observe an average route length of about 13 hops, which decreases to about 4 hops for scenarios with
10 misbehaving nodes. Thus, if we introduce black holes, the network becomes partitioned logically
and communication is possible only if source and destination are in close proximity. This effect can be
explained by the expanding ring search described in Section 2.2.3, which is used by the AODV routing
protocol to limit the overhead introduced by the broadcast-based route discovery process. During the ex-
panding ring search, the broadcast is, at the beginning, limited to the direct neighborhood of the source
node and extended to the whole network only if the destination can not be found nearby the source.
Thus, if the destination node is located in a ring closer to the source than the ring that contains the next
misbehaving node, the misbehaving node does not receive the corresponding route request and is not
able to tamper with the route. The further away the destination is located from the source, the higher
the probability is for a black hole to receive the route request. We further quantify this effect in Section
3.3.
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Figure 3.14: Route length
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Network Delays
Figure 3.15 shows the transmission delay of packets transmitted successfully, measured from sending
application to receiving application. The transmission delay consists of the routing delay on the source
shown in Figure 3.16, and the propagation delay of the network shown in Figure 3.17. The routing
delay on the source node is the time it takes the AODV routing protocol to establish a route to the
destination. Note that the routing delay does not affect each packet. Only packets sent at the beginning
of a stream have to be buffered until a route is discovered. However, we present the average routing
delay experienced by all packets. The propagation delay denotes the time a packet takes to travel through
the network to the receiving application.
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Figure 3.15: Transmission delay from application to application
For obvious reasons, the routing and propagation delays and, thus, the overall transmission delay
directly depend on the route length in hops and do not show unexpected results. It only stands out that
the maximum delay for both the address-based and the location-based intrusion response are slightly
lower than for a defenseless network without malicious nodes.
For the routing delay, this can be explained by the fact that, in case a misbehaving node was part of
a route and was detected, the expanding ring search of AODV does not start from the very beginning,
but from the ring that contained the misbehaving node. Thus, the routing delay for packets that are
transmitted successfully after misbehavior was detected decreases.
For the propagation delay, this can be explained by the fact that the delays are measured on a per
packet basis. Thus, if less packets are transmitted successfully via long routes, the average delay de-
creases. In scenarios with misbehaving nodes, long routes are affected by misbehaving nodes with a
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higher probability than short routes, which is due to the expanding ring search mechanism of AODV.
Thus, on long routes more packets get lost due to intrusion response than on short routes. Therefore,
although the length of routes established successfully in scenarios with misbehavior and optimal intru-
sion response matches the route length in a network without misbehavior and intrusion response, the
average delay is slightly lower.
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Figure 3.16: Routing delay on source node
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Figure 3.17: Propagation delay from source to destination
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3.3 Analytical Validation
In this section, to double-check the correctness of the simulation results, we develop an analytical model
describing the effects of the black hole attack and of the location-based intrusion response on the packet
loss observed in the network. After defining basic assumptions, we start with modeling the expanding
ring search behavior of the AODV routing protocol which leads to the probability for a black hole being
included in a route. Based on this, we describe the packet loss caused by black holes in a defenseless
network without intrusion detection and intrusion response. We continue with modeling the packet loss
caused by black holes with activated location-based intrusion response. For this, we consider the time
the intrusion detection system requires to detect a black hole and the mobility of nodes. A model for the
packet loss caused by the location-based intrusion response itself concludes this section.
Table 3.4: Notations of formulae
tmon Monitoring interval of the intrusion detection system in seconds
nX ,rec Number of packets Node X received during tmon
nX , f orw Number of packets Node X forwarded during tmon
wbal Factor to balance nX ,rec and nX , f orw
RX ,Y Rating for Node Y determined by the intrusion detection system of
Node X
thresblack Threshold of RY for classification as black hole
rquar Radius of quarantined areas
tdetect Time needed to detect a black hole
t reset Time after which quarantined areas are revoked
rt rans Transmission range of nodes
Anet Size of the network
l Side length of the network area
dhop Average distance per hop
ntotal Total number of nodes in the network
nblack Number of black hole nodes in the network
ns Number of nodes reached in step s of the ring search
ρ Network density in nodes per area
3.3.1 Assumptions
In the following, we assume
• a square network area Anet with side length l,
• a circular transmission area with radius rt rans,
• quarantined areas to match the transmission area of the corresponding misbehaving node at the
time the quarantined area is established,
• a geometrically uniformly distributed random placement of benign nodes and black holes within
the network area,
• randomly selected sources and destinations of traffic,
• a random distribution of traffic patterns among all nodes, that is, the network load is constant and
nodes can not be distinguished by their communication,
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• a connected network, that is, a route between any two nodes can be established at any time.
3.3.2 Expanding Ring Search
For modeling the packet loss, we need to describe the expanding ring search of AODV in terms of the
number of new nodes a route request message reaches in each step as shown in Figure 3.18. For this,
let Ah be the circular area covering all nodes located in a distance of at most h hops to the source of the
route request, where A0 = 0 and ∆Ah = Ah− Ah−1. Depending on the actual network configuration, a fix
average geometric per-hop routing progress 0< dhop < rt rans can be assumed. For our model, we use
dhop =
rt ransp
2
which was obtained experimentally in [36] for a realistic mobile ad hoc network configuration. This
leads to a first estimate ∆Λh of ∆Ah defined as
∆Λh = Λh−Λh−1 = pi(h · dhop)2−pi((h− 1)dhop)2
= (2h− 1)pi · d2hop
Figure 3.18: Schematic representation of the area covered by the expanding ring search subject to dhop. Note that,
for reasons of presentation, dimensions do not match the assumptions made for the model.
This description holds if the ring search does not leave the simulation area. To include edge effects
for nodes being located at the borders of the simulation area, we use a four-step approximation. For
a ring radius r = h · dhop < 0.5 · l of less than half the side length l of the simulation area, the ring can
be contained fully in the simulation area in the best case, for a node being located at the center. In the
worst case, for a node being located at a corner, only one quarter of the ring reaches into the simulation
area. For the approximation, we assume that both cases and any in between are equally likely. Thus, for
r = h · dhop < 0.5 · l we obtain
∆Ah =
1
2

Λh+
1
4
Λh

In analogy, we approximate the cases for a ring radius between half side length and side length,
between side length and diagonal length, and larger than diagonal length. Altogether, we obtain
∆Ah =

1
2

Λh+
1
4
Λh

if h · dhop ≤ l2
1
8
Λh if
l
2
< h · dhop ≤ l
1
16
Λh if l < h · dhop ≤
p
2l2
0 otherwise
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As described in Section 2.2.3, the expanding ring search is performed in consecutive steps in each of
which the time to live of a route request is incremented. Let hs be the time to live in hops for step s. With
the default parameters specified in [78], hs is given by the following table (we set h0 = 0 for reasons of
simplification).
s 0 1 2 3 4 5
hs 0 1 3 5 7 35
For modeling the number ns of nodes that are reached in step s of the expanding ring search, let ntotal
be the total number of nodes and Anet be the total area of the network. Because nodes are assumed to
be distributed uniformly, the geometric density of nodes is given by
ρ =
ntotal
Anet
We get
n0 = 0
ns = ns−1+∆ns where ∆ns =
hs∑
i=hs−1+1
∆Ai ·ρ
3.3.3 Packet Loss Caused by Black Holes in a Defenseless Network
To model the packet loss caused by black holes, we start with describing the probability pblack(s) for a
route request reaching at least one black hole until step s of the expanding ring search. If we assume
nblack black holes in ntotal total nodes, we have ntotal − nblack benign nodes in the network. Thus, the
number of possible combinations to select the ns nodes that are reached in step s of the ring search only
from benign nodes is
x =

ntotal − nblack
ns

The number of combinations for selecting the ns nodes from ntotal total nodes is
y =

ntotal
ns

Now, x · y−1 describes the probability that a route request reaches only benign nodes until step s of
the ring search. For the probability pblack(s) that a route request reaches at least one black hole until
step s of the ring search, we have to consider the special case of ns > ntotal − nblack, that is, the number
of nodes reached in step s exceeds the number of benign nodes. Certainly, the route request reaches a
black hole in this case. Altogether, we get
pblack(s) =
 1 if ns > ntotal − nblack1− (ntotal−nblackns )(ntotalns ) otherwise
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We assume a random selection of traffic patterns as well as of source and destination nodes. Hence,
the probability for a data packet to get lost due to a black hole equals the probability for a black hole
being part of the corresponding route between source and destination. To determine this, we need to
calculate the probability pdest(s) for reaching the destination node in step s of the ring search. Since
destinations are assumed to be chosen randomly, this probability correlates to ∆ns. We obtain
pdest(s) =
∆ns
ntotal
With this, the probability for the route request reaching the destination in step s and at least one black
hole until step s of the ring search is given by pdest(s) · pblack(s). For the overall probability ploss,black for
data packets to get lost due to a black hole, we need to consider all steps of the expanding ring search.
We get
ploss,black =
5∑
i=1
pdest(i) · pblack(i)
3.3.4 Packet Loss Caused by Black Holes with Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Response
Although the location-based intrusion response excludes black hole nodes from the network, the in-
fluence of black holes can only be mitigated and not be thwarted completely. Thus, the probability
ploss,de f ended for packet loss caused by black holes despite active security measures can be described as
ploss,de f ended = ploss,black · pIRS f ail
Here, pIRS f ail denotes the probability that the intrusion response system fails to prevent a black hole
from dropping packets. As main factors on pIRS f ail we identified the detection time of the intrusion
detection system and the mobility of nodes. Both lead to independent parts pIRS f ail,detect and pIRS f ail,mov e
of pIRS f ail . Thus, we obtain
pIRS f ail = pIRS f ail,detect + pIRS f ail,mov e
Impact of the Intrusion Detection System
To detect ongoing misbehavior, the intrusion detection system has to monitor the suspicious node for
a certain time. In our scenario, the black hole may continue dropping packets during this time. To
describe the resulting probability pIRS f ail,detect (as a part of pIRS f ail) for packet loss during the time, the
intrusion detection system needs to identify misbehavior, we start by modeling the detection time. For
our intrusion detection system as introduced in Section 3.1.4, the detection time is given as
tdetect = nmon · tmon
where nmon denotes the number of monitoring intervals required until a black hole is detected and
tmon denotes the duration of a monitoring interval.
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As described, a node Y is classified as a black hole if the rating rX ,Y of Y by Node X exceeds the
threshold thresblack. Since, in our case, a black hole node does not forward any packets, rX ,Y is defined
as
rX ,Y =
nX ,rec
wbal
per monitoring interval tmon. If we consider a steadily loaded network, the traffic during the detection
time is (nearly) constant at a rate λ. Thus, nX ,rec = λ · tmon. If a black hole is detected,
nmon · λ · tmonwbal > thresblack
holds. The number nmon of monitoring intervals required to detect a black hole is then defined as
nmon =
thresblack ·wbal
λ · tmon
Thus, for the detection time of the intrusion detection system, we obtain
tdetect =
thresblack ·wbal
λ
After a black hole is detected, the corresponding quarantined area excludes the black hole from the
network for the time t reset . Altogether, a black hole can be active for the time tdetect as part of the total
detection-protection-period tdetect + t reset . Thus, for the probability pIRS f ail,detect of losing packets due
to nblack black holes during the detection time of the intrusion detection system, we obtain
pIRS f ail,detect = nblack · tdetecttdetect + t reset
Impact of Node Mobility
We assume that quarantined areas can not be adapted directly when a node moves since tracking is not
possible when a node is quarantined. Thus, as shown in Figure 3.19, mobility of a black hole leads to a
newly affected area Aa f f ec t . Nodes in this area are not aware of the black hole and will forward route
request messages without restrictions.
The probability pIRS f ail,mov e for packet loss due to node mobility can be modeled based on the number
na f f ec t of nodes located in Aa f f ec t . Each of these nodes has to perform a detection of the black hole,
leading to a corresponding multiple of pIRS f ail,detect as described in the previous section.
The angle α, as shown in Figure 3.19, can be determined by
α= 2 · arccos

d
2rt rans

where d denotes the distance between the location where the black hole was first detected and its new
location. With this, we can determine the area Aseg of the circular segment defined by the quarantine
zone and Aa f f ec t . We get
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Figure 3.19: Influence of black hole mobility on the IRS
Aseg =
r2t rans
2
· (α− sin(α))
thus,
Aa f f ec t = pir
2
t rans − 2 · Aseg
Since nodes are distributed uniformly within the network area, we get
na f f ec t = Aa f f ec t ·ρ
Thus, the loss due to node mobility can be described as
pIRS f ail,mov e = na f f ec t · nblack · pIRS f ail,detect
3.3.5 Packet Loss Caused by the Intrusion Response System
Packet loss caused by the intrusion response system arises from benign nodes being source or destination
of a communication while located in quarantined areas. To model the probability ploss,IRS for packet
loss due to intrusion response, we, thus, have to determine the number of nodes that are located in
quarantined areas.
To calculate the total area Aquar(nblack) that is covered by quarantined areas, we use a simple heuristic
for the probability plap(nblack) that quarantined areas overlap. This is the case if the distance between
two black holes is less than 2rt rans. We define
plap(1) = 0
plap(i) =
Alap(i− 1)
Anet
if i > 1
The areas Alap(nblack) that are needed to determine plap(nblack) are defined as
Alap(1) = pi · (2 · rt rans)2
Alap(i) = Alap(i− 1) + (1− plap(i)) ·pi(2 · rt rans)2 if i > 1
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With this, Aquar(nblack) can be calculated as
Aquar(1) = pi · rt rans
Aquar(i) = Aquar(i− 1) +pir2t rans · (1− plap(i)) if i > 1
To determine ploss,IRS, we now have to describe the probability of either source, or destination, or both
nodes being located within a quarantined area. Since nodes are distributed uniformly, the probability
that an arbitrarily chosen node is available (that is, not quarantined) is given as
pav ail = 1− Aquar(nblack)Anet
The probability that both source and destination are available is p2av ail . Thus, we obtain
ploss,IRS = 1− p2av ail
3.3.6 Comparison of Model Predictions and Simulation Results
To validate our work, we compare predictions made by the model with the results of the simulation study
we presented in 3.2. To visually demonstrate the accuracy achieved, we show the model predictions
as curves together with the 95% confidence bars taken from the simulation results in Figure 3.20. To
repeat the details required for the model, the simulation results were obtained from a scenario consisting
of ntotal = 1000 nodes with nblack ∈ {1,2,3,5, 10} black holes on a square simulation area Anet with
l = 4750m side length. The nodes moved continuously according to a random waypoint mobility model
with a speed between 1 and 2 meters per second. This leads to an average distance
d =
t reset ·meters
6 · second
from the location at which a black hole was detected to its new location when the quarantined area
is revoked. We used a constant bitrate traffic pattern with a network load of 20 streams in parallel
consisting of packets with a size of 512 byte at a rate of 2048 bytes per second. With a detection
threshold thresblack = 10 determined as an optimum in preliminary simulations for the scenario given,
the resulting detection time of the intrusion detection system is tdetect = 1s. The reset intervals for
quarantined areas were taken from t reset ∈ {15,30,45,60,90,120,180,300,420,600} in seconds.
The comparison of the loss caused by black holes in a defenseless network is shown in Figure 3.20a.
For the 2, 3, and 5 black hole scenarios, the model prediction is within the confidence interval of the
simulation results. The small deviation for the setups with 1 and 10 black holes can be explained by the
inaccuracy of the heuristic we used to model edge effects of the expanding ring search. Yet, the error of
the model prediction is alway less than two times the simulation confidence as shown in Table 3.5.
Figure 3.20b shows the comparison of the loss caused by black holes in a network with intrusion
detection and location-based intrusion response. Please note that, for reasons of readability, only the
results for the 1, 5, and 10 black hole scenarios are presented.
While prediction and confidence intervals (that is, simulation results) match well for the 1 black hole
scenario (and, without presentation, for the 2 and 3 black hole scenarios), it stands out that, for the 5
and 10 black hole setups, the prediction and the simulation results differ strongly (note that the curve
matching the 10 black hole confidence bars belongs to the 5 black hole prediction). Rerunning and
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Figure 3.20: Comparison of model predictions (curves) and simulation results (confidence bars)
Table 3.5: Comparison of model predictions and simulation results for the packet loss due to black holes in a
defenseless network
model pre- simulation simulation
nblack diction x result y confidence z
x − y x−y
z
1 0.720 0.643 0.067 0.077 1.144
2 0.789 0.755 0.056 0.034 0.611
3 0.807 0.795 0.038 0.013 0.334
5 0.830 0.856 0.018 -0.026 -1.454
10 0.866 0.909 0.022 -0.043 -1.964
tracing the simulations, we found that in the scenario with 5 black holes only 4 and in the scenario with
10 black holes only 5 are active at the same time. We put this down to overlapping quarantined areas
and to effects of black holes located at the edges of the simulation area. If we instantiate the model
accordingly (4 / 10 black holes in the model for the 5 / 10 black hole simulation setups), we obtain a
match for all scenarios as shown in Figure 3.20c.
The comparison of the loss that is caused by the intrusion response system itself is shown in Figure
3.20d. Again, we obtain a reasonable match of model and simulation. Yet, in this case the simulation
results show significant variances, which are due to false positives of the intrusion detection system that
are not considered by the model.
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3.4 Conclusion - Location-based Intrusion Response
In this chapter, we showed that intrusion response in mobile ad hoc networks should not be performed
based on network addresses of misbehaving nodes. By means of simulation, we proved that an address-
based intrusion response can be subverted easily and effectively by a Sybil attack. To overcome this
drawback, we proposed a location-based intrusion response system. Our studies show that this intrusion
response strategy is not affected by Sybil attacks and manages to maintain the basic functionality of the
network even in the presence of multiple malicious nodes. Note that our results hold for the assump-
tions we made for the evaluation and the analytical validation in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. In particular, we
considered a connected network and a low number of misbehaving nodes. In more adverse conditions,
intrusion response might be insufficient to recover network functionality. In these scenarios, robust,
broadcast-based routing protocols such as [81] or disruption-tolerant, mobility-based message dissemi-
nation as proposed in [33, 109] can be deployed. Still, supporting these protocols by quarantined areas
to, for example, stop the spreading of flooding attacks can be reasonable.
Although the location-based intrusion response is insusceptible to changes in addresses of misbehaving
nodes, it is limited by inherent drawbacks. In its naïve version, quarantined areas are of the size of the
transmission/reception range of nodes. As a first drawback, this results in a considerable number of
benign nodes that are located in quarantined areas and, thus, are excluded from the network. Second,
routes between benign nodes outside quarantined areas are interrupted due to intermediate nodes being
quarantined. We consider these drawbacks, as shown schematically in Figure 3.21, to be the most severe
ones. Therefore, in the following chapters, we will be concerned with how to optimize the performance
of the location-based intrusion response mechanism.
Figure 3.21: Drawbacks of the location-based IRS
At this point, a discussion on the feasibility of mobile ad hoc networks when faced with drop rates
around 10% even in the best case may arise. Opinions about this differ widely. Our goal is to offer reliable
(basic) communication and information services in scenarios where a communication infrastructure is
not available, as it may be the case in large-scale disaster scenarios. Here, mobile ad hoc networks
can be deployed to enable communication at all. When taking a look behind the scenes, this could be a
useful innovation even if performance (bandwidth) is ’wasted’ due to heavy error correction mechanisms.
We also remember similar discussions in the early times of (infrastructure based) IEEE 802.11 wireless
networks. In this case, mechanisms that are able to deal with (most of) the drawbacks have been
successfully developed such that these networks today offer a valuable alternative for wired networks in
many scenarios.
To be able to predict the behavior of the location-based intrusion response for other parameter sets
than those studied in this chapter, we developed an analytical model that describes the effects of black
hole attacks and of the location-based intrusion response. Based on a combined geometric and stochastic
approach, we developed an analytical model for the routing process as well as for the packet loss caused
by the misbehavior and by the countermeasures. The comparison of model predictions and simulation
results shows that the model developed produces reasonable predictions despite following an elementary
approach.
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4 Supporting Location-based Intrusion Response in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks with Adaptive
Transmission Power
In this chapter, we analyze how an adaptive transmission power of benign devices can be used to reduce
the size of quarantined areas in order to mitigate the drawbacks of the location-based intrusion response
mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks discussed in Section 3.4. In the following, we introduce different
approaches for extending the location-based intrusion response by an adaptive transmission power. We
evaluate the approaches presented with focus on discovering positive and negative effects of an adaptive
transmission power with respect to the size of quarantined areas and node mobility.
4.1 Architecture
In this section, we describe the add-ons for adaptive transmission power to the first, naïve version of
location-based intrusion response introduced in Chapter 3. We provide mathematical descriptions of the
adaptive transmission power based on the free space model for wireless signal propagation explained in
Section 2.2.1.
4.1.1 Naïve Location-based Intrusion Response
In the first, naïve version of of the location-based intrusion response mechanism as introduced in Chapter
3, transmission power is static. Thus, the radius rquar of a quarantined area has to cover at least the
distance after which a signal can not be received correctly anymore. For the naïve approach, rquar is
calculated as
rquar =
È
Ps · Gs · Gr · λ
2
4 ·pi2 · Pmin
With the settings used for the evaluation of the naïve approach as listed in Table 3.1, we obtain
rquar = 250m. To offer a security buffer for node mobility, rquar can be increased appropriately which
will be subject of our evaluation.
4.1.2 Location-based Intrusion Response with Adaptive Transmission Power
If benign nodes are capable of adapting their transmission power PS, we may reduce the size of quar-
antined areas and, thus, minimize the number of benign nodes that are excluded from the network. In
theory, it is possible to reduce transmission power such that a quarantined area can be reduced to one
single point in Cartesian space. Still, it is reasonable to have a security buffer for node mobility. Being
given rquar and the distance dcenter from a node’s location to the center of the closest quarantined area,
we can calculate PS as
PS(dcenter)<
Pmin
Gs · Gr ·
4 ·pi2 · (dcenter − rquar)2
λ2
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4.1.3 Location-based Intrusion Response with Adaptive Transmission Power and Asymmetry
Prevention
Although we assume an IEEE 802.11 medium access control protocol based on the request to send/clear
to send handshake outlined in Section 2.2.2, we introduce asymmetric links by reducing the transmission
power. While route request messages are sent as a broadcast without the handshake sequence that would
prevent asymmetric links, route reply messages are sent as unicast messages. This may lead to scenarios
where a node that operates with reduced transmission power is able to receive and forward a route
request message, but will not be able to forward the corresponding route reply message on its way back
to the initiator of the route request. To prevent this, we further extend the adaptive transmission power
such that a node operating at reduced transmission power only forwards a route request message if the
distance to the node from which it received the route request is less than dcenter . Figure 4.1 depicts this
situation. The case without an asymmetry prevention is shown in Figure 4.1a. Figure 4.1b shows the
route request and route reply phases if an asymmetry prevention is used. The upper figures show the
dissemination of route request messages. The route reply phase is shown in the lower figures.
(a) Without asymmetry prevention (b) With asymmetry prevention
Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of the location-based intrusion response with and without asymmetry pre-
vention
4.2 Evaluation
The goal of the evaluation is to compare the location-based intrusion response with adaptive transmission
power and with and without asymmetry prevention to the naïve approach presented in Chapter 3. The
evaluation is based on a series of simulation studies performed with the (further extended) JiST/MobNet
simulation tool [56]. Unless specified otherwise, we use the metrics and configurations described in
Section 3.2.
4.2.1 Experimental Design
After preliminary simulations, we defined the parameters and factors used for the evaluation such that
the system operates within normal bounds.
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Parameters
The parameters used for the evaluation are shown in Table 4.1. The parameters differ from those spec-
ified in Table 3.1 for the evaluation of the naïve approach in that we fixed the number of misbehaving
nodes to 10, thus considering the worst-case scenario. Only to obtain the baseline, for a defenseless net-
work, we considered a variable number of misbehaving nodes while keeping the total number of nodes
fixed at 1000. Further, although we considered a variable time t reset after which quarantined areas are
revoked in our simulation studies, we only show the results obtained for t reset=300s in the presentation of
the results. t reset = 300s showed to be the optimum configuration in all simulation studies we performed.
Table 4.1: Network parameters as used in the simulation studies
Number of nodes 1000
Benign nodes 990
Black hole nodes 10
Quarantine time t reset 300s
Factors
The factors that showed to have a considerable influence on our evaluation metrics are (1) the size of
quarantined areas as defined by rquar and (2) the velocity of nodes. The values used for evaluation
are listed in Table 4.2. For the evaluation of the location-based intrusion response with and without
adaptive transmission power and asymmetry prevention, we performed a full-factorial simulation study
regarding quarantine radius and velocity of nodes. For the baseline scenarios in a defenseless network,
we performed a full-factorial study regarding number of misbehaving nodes and velocity of nodes.
Table 4.2: Factors as used in the simulation studies
Number of misbehaving nodes out of all nodes (considered only for
a defenseless network, otherwise fixed to 10)
1, 3, 5, 10
Quarantine radius rquar in meters (note that for the naïve approach
rquar is added to the minimal required quarantine radius of 250
meters)
0, 5, 15, 50
Velocity of nodes in meters per second 0, 1, 10
4.2.2 Analysis of the Results
We now discuss the results of the simulation study, proceeding as for the evaluation of the naïve approach
for location-based intrusion response presented in Section 3.2.9. In the discussion, we focus on effects
caused by an adapted transmission power and an adapted quarantine radius as well as on effects of node
velocity. All of the following plots are shown with 95% confidence intervals. By ’AP’, we denote the
asymmetry prevention.
Packet Loss Caused by Black Holes
The loss caused by black holes in a defenseless network subject to the number of black holes and to
the velocity of nodes is shown in Figure 4.2a. We observe that black holes have a higher impact in
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scenarios with low node velocity. This can be explained with the help of the length of the routes that
are established successfully as shown in Figure 4.12a. Also for scenarios without black hole nodes, the
route length decreases if node velocity increases. Thus, the higher the velocity, the shorter the functional
routes, the lower the probability for a black hole being part of a route.
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Figure 4.2: Packet loss caused by black holes
Figures 4.2b to 4.2d show the ratio of packets dropped by black hole nodes subject to the different
strategies of adaptive transmission power and subject to the radius of quarantined areas rquar . For static
scenarios, we manage to reduce the loss caused by black holes from more than 90% in a defenseless
network down to less than 2%. Since we assume that a black hole can not be tracked while it is quaran-
tined, an adaptation of quarantined areas if the black hole moves is not possible. Thus, if nodes move,
black holes leave quarantined areas and can become active again. The greater the velocity, the faster this
happens. Therefore, we obtain higher loss rates caused by black holes if we increase node velocity. For a
velocity of 10 meters per second, also the size of quarantined areas has a remarkable effect. The larger
the quarantined area, the longer the protection is effective (recall that for the naïve approach, without
adaptive transmission power, the transmission range of 250 meters is added to rquar). If the quarantine
radius is chosen too small, a black hole manages to leave quarantine already during the route discovery
process and can become active again faster compared to using a larger quarantine radius.
What stands out in the scenario with a node velocity of 10 meters per second is that the loss caused
by black holes is slightly but statistically significantly higher for an adaptive transmission power with
asymmetry prevention. Again, this can be explained by the route length observed in this scenario as
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shown in Figure 4.12d. Since the route length is higher if an adaptive transmission power with asymme-
try prevention is used, the probability for a black hole being part of a route is increased compared to the
other strategies.
Altogether, by using adaptive transmission power, we manage to considerably reduce the size of quar-
antined areas. Still, we are able to keep the packet loss caused by black holes comparable to the naïve
approach of location-based intrusion response for appropriate choices of the size of quarantined areas
with respect to node velocity.
Packet Loss Caused by Inherent Network Properties
Figure 4.3 shows the packet loss caused by inherent network properties which is the sum of (1) the
loss caused by collisions on the wireless medium shown in Figure 4.4, (2) the loss caused by exhausted
queuing space in the network interface shown in Figure 4.5, and (3) the loss caused by the AODV routing
protocol in case of route breaks shown in Figure 4.6.
We observe that the inherent loss is strongly affected by both node velocity and the different strategies
for location-based intrusion response. For all strategies, the inherent loss increases along with node
velocity. For all node velocities, the loss is higher if an adaptive transmission power is used; highest for
an adaptive transmission power without asymmetry prevention. The largest part of this loss is caused by
the AODV routing protocol, as we will see in the following.
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Figure 4.3: Packet loss caused by inherent network properties
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The loss caused by collisions on the wireless medium is shown in Figure 4.4. For a defenseless network,
the effects are comparable to those observed in Section 3.2.9 and can be explained in analogy. For
scenarios with location-based intrusion response and mobile nodes, we observe an increased loss for
small-sized quarantined areas if an adaptive transmission power is used. This can be explained together
with the increased black hole activity for small-sized quarantined areas observed in Figure 4.2 by reasons
similar to those given in Section 3.2.9. Further, the number of packets dropped due to collisions increases
along with the velocity of nodes. This can be explained by the packet loss caused by AODV due to route
breaks, shown in Figure 4.6. The probability of route breaks increases along with the velocity of nodes.
An increased number of route breaks leads to an increased number of route requests. Since these are
sent as broadcast messages, we obtain an increased network load which leads to an increased number
of collisions.
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Figure 4.4: Packet loss caused by collisions on the wireless medium
The packet loss caused by exhausted queuing space shows only minor variations as depicted in Figure
4.5. The tendency towards a higher loss for larger quarantined areas and adaptive power observed in
Figure 4.5d can be explained by the corresponding loss caused by AODV due to route breaks shown in
Figure 4.6d. If the number of route breaks increases, the number of packets that have to be queued and,
potentially, dropped if queuing space is exhausted until a new route is discovered also increases.
Figure 4.6 shows the packet loss caused by the AODV routing protocol. Here, clearly the drawbacks of
an adaptive transmission power become obvious. Without the asymmetry prevention strategy, even for a
low node velocity and static scenarios, the loss caused by the routing protocol is intolerable. The effects
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Figure 4.5: Packet loss caused by exhausted queuing space in the network interface
that we depicted schematically in Figure 4.1 lead to a packet loss reaching from 20% for static scenarios
up to more than 60% in scenarios with a node velocity of 10 meters per second. Considerably better,
but still worse results than for the naïve approach approach without adaptive power can be achieved
with the asymmetry prevention strategy. We can conclude that a reduced transmission power leads to an
increased loss due to broken routes or routes that cannot be established at all, since we have less room
for node movement without leaving transmission ranges. The effect is amplified if the quarantine radius
is increased, since the transmission power in this case has to be reduced even further.
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Figure 4.6: Packet loss caused by the AODV routing protocol
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Packet Loss Caused by and Performance of Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Response
The packet loss caused by intrusion response is shown in Figure 4.7. The results show that, with the
power adaptive strategies, we achieve our goal of reducing the loss caused by intrusion response itself.
Even for a high node velocity, we achieve a loss of less than 5% which can be explained by the reduced
size of quarantined areas and, along with this, by the reduced number of benign nodes affected. It
stands out that the loss caused by intrusion response is always (nearly) zero for an adaptive power
without asymmetry prevention. This is due to the fact that, in this case, the packet loss is shifted to the
AODV routing protocol for which we observed loss rates above 60% because routes break frequently or
cannot be discovered at all.
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Figure 4.7: Packet loss caused by intrusion response
To ensure that equal preconditions regarding the intrusion detection system hold for all variants of
location-based intrusion response and adaptive transmission power, we show the detection rate and
the false positive rate of the intrusion detection system in Figures 4.8 and 4.9. The results do not show
unexpected anomalies except for the large confidence intervals for an adaptive power without asymmetry
prevention observed for scenarios with static nodes and small-sized quarantined areas for both detection
performance and false positives.
The variations in detection performance directly depend on the increased false positive rate and can
be explained in analogy to the reasons provided in Section 3.2.9. In case of a large number of false
positive detections, the black hole may be already isolated without being detected directly. This rare
case decreases the detection rate slightly.
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The increased false positive rate and its large confidence intervals are a direct result of the asymmetry
effect described in Section 4.1.3. Since the intrusion detection system monitors all unicast messages (that
is, it does not differentiate between route reply messages and data messages), route reply messages that
are received, but not forwarded correctly may lead to a false positive detection of a benign node. The
effect is increased for small-sized quarantine areas, since, in this case, the transmission power may be
reduced strongly, for nodes being located in close proximity to misbehaving nodes. Thus, the further
transmission power is reduced, the more likely asymmetry effects will occur.
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Figure 4.8: Detection rate of the intrusion detection system
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Figure 4.9: False positive rate of the intrusion detection system
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Overall Packet Loss and Delivery Ratios
The overall packet loss observed in the network is shown in Figure 4.10. Here, it gets obvious that the
improvement of a significantly reduced loss caused by intrusion response is canceled out by the increased
loss caused by AODV. A minor overall improvement can be observed for a low velocity, if an adaptive
power is used together with asymmetry prevention. Without asymmetry prevention, the adaptive power
performs worse than the naïve approach for location-based intrusion response without adaptive power.
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Figure 4.10: Overall packet loss
To double check the correctness of the packet loss, we present the overall delivery ratio in Figure 4.11
(recall that packet delivery is monitored independently from packet loss). Since the delivery ratios match
the overall packet loss, we assume correctness of the results presented so far.
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Figure 4.11: Overall delivery ratio
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Route Lengths
Figure 4.12 shows how the length of routes that have been established successfully is affected by the
velocity of nodes as well as by the different strategies for location-based intrusion response. For all
strategies, the route length decreases when node velocity increases. Thus, node mobility not only causes
route breaks but also affects the route discovery process, which only takes a relatively short time. Obvi-
ously, during the time a route request is propagated to the destination until the route reply is sent back,
the topology changes so rapidly that the path via which the route request reached the destination is not
available anymore.
Regarding the different strategies for location-based intrusion response, we observe that routes tend
to be shorter if an adaptive transmission power is used in scenarios with high node velocity. This can be
explained in analogy to the reasons provided in Section 3.2.9. Recalling that route lengths are monitored
on a per packet basis, the probability for route breaks increases if transmission power decreases because
nodes move out of each others transmission range faster. Thus, less packets are transmitted successfully
over long routes if transmission power is reduced.
For scenarios with high node velocity, we also observe a shorter route length for small-sized quaran-
tined areas, if an adaptive transmission power is used. Since black holes moving at a high velocity leave
small-sized quarantined areas after a short time, black hole activity is increased as shown in Figure 4.2d.
Thus, route length decreases in this case.
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Figure 4.12: Route length
62 4 Supporting Location-based Intrusion Response in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks with Adaptive Transmission Power
Network Delays
The transmission delay measured from sending application to receiving application is shown in Figure
4.13. About 90% of the delay observed from application to application is caused by the routing delay on
the source node shown in Figure 4.14. The propagation delay of the multi-hop route shown in Figure
4.15 makes up the remainder.
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Figure 4.13: Transmission delay from application to application
We observe that the transmission delay is strongly affected by node velocity. This is explained by the
fact that routes are stable only for a short time if nodes move at high velocity. Thus, if node velocity
increases, new routes have to be discovered frequently, causing an increased routing delay as a major
part of the transmission delay.
Also for the propagation delay it holds that delay increases along with node velocity. This is due to
the fact that network traffic increases along with node velocity due to the increased route maintenance
required. If network traffic increases, more packets have to be queued before transmission, which also
can be deduced from the increased loss due to exhausted queuing space shown in Figure 4.5. Thus, also
the propagation delay of a multi-hop route increases.
Regarding the variants of location-based intrusion response with adaptive power, we observe a shorter
delay for small-sized quarantined areas which can be explained in analogy to the reasons given in Section
3.2.9. Small sized-quarantined areas lead to an increased activity of black hole nodes and, thus, to an
increased number of route breaks induced by intrusion response. Since, in case of a route break, the
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expanding ring search of AODV continues where it was left off and not from the beginning, the average
time required for route discovery decreases in this case.
Further, the delay is higher if an adaptive power without asymmetry prevention is used in scenarios
with mobile nodes, which is best seen in Figure 4.13c, where the effect is only marginally mixed with
effects of black hole activity. This is due to asymmetry effects causing a higher number of route discovery
processes required to establish a functional route, amplified by route breaks induced by node mobility.
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Figure 4.14: Routing delay on source node
4.3 Conclusion - Adaptive Transmission Power
In this chapter, we identified possibilities and limitations of supporting location-based intrusion response
in mobile ad hoc networks by an adaptive transmission power. We proposed a simple power reduction
scheme and a scheme that prevents effects of asymmetric links that arise when using an adaptive power
in combination with the IEEE 802.11 medium access control scheme.
The evaluation showed that an adaptive power is able to considerably improve unwanted side-effects
of the location-based intrusion response. Both the size of quarantined areas and the packet loss caused
by intrusion response itself were reduced significantly. Still, the approach suffers from an increased
packet loss caused by the (non power-aware) AODV routing protocol. We conclude that an adaptive
transmission power can be used to effectively support location-based intrusion response in mobile ad
hoc networks, if the routing protocol deployed is able to handle the resulting effects.
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Figure 4.15: Propagation delay from source to destination
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5 Supporting Location-based Intrusion Response in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks with Delay
Tolerant Communication
In this chapter, we describe how time can be used as a further dimension for overcoming the limitations
of the location-based intrusion response in mobile ad hoc networks stated in Section 3.4. By harnessing
delay tolerance of applications such as e-mail, we increase network performance in terms of packets
transmitted successfully. We describe different strategies of how a delayed communication can be real-
ized. In a series of simulation studies we scrutinize the trade-offs between reliability and transmission
delay.
5.1 Architecture
We now describe how the system architecture for location-based intrusion response presented in Section
3.1 is extended to support delay tolerant communication.
5.1.1 The Bundle Layer
To enable delay tolerant communication, we use a simplified version of the Bundle Layer discussed in
Section 2.9. The combination with the Licklider Protocol is not necessary since, in our scenario, the
wireless data link layer is based on the IEEE 802.11 protocol and, thus, is not subject to high delays.
Regarding disruption tolerance, also a proxied TCP variant would have been applicable. Yet, for reasons
of flexibility, we chose not to be bound to TCP as transport protocol.
The mode of operation of our implementation of the Bundle Protocol is shown in Figure 5.1. The
Bundle Layer is added between transport layer and application layer as specified in [94]. Packets that
would have been dropped by the location-based intrusion response due to quarantined benign nodes are
handed to the Bundle Layer for delayed retransmission. This is done at the sender as well as at each
intermediate node.
Figure 5.1: Integration of the Bundle Layer for managing delay tolerant communication
The Bundle Layer is parameterized by the time span t ret rans between two subsequent retransmission
attempts and the number nret rans of retransmission attempts that are performed per packet. Note that
nret rans is a global value. The number of retransmission attempts left is (besides other information
required) transmitted in an additional Bundle Header of the packet.
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5.1.2 Buffered and Unbuffered Intrusion Detection
Our intrusion detection system, as described in Section 3.1.4, is based on monitoring the packet forward-
ing behavior of nodes in transmission range. If a monitored node turns out to be a black hole, all packets
sent to the black hole during the monitoring phase are lost.
To mitigate this drawback, we extend the intrusion detection system by a buffered monitoring phase.
In contrast to the first, unbuffered version described in Section 3.1.4, all packets that are sent during
the monitoring phase are buffered by the monitoring node. If the monitored node is classified as a black
hole, the buffer content is handed to the Bundle Layer for retransmission. Otherwise, the monitoring
node flushes the buffer without further action.
5.1.3 Transparent and Non-transparent Location-based Intrusion Response
As described in Section 3.1.6, the location-based intrusion response mechanism excludes a misbehaving
node based on its location. If a node B is classified as a black hole by a node X , X establishes a quaran-
tined area at B’s location.
In the first version of the location-based intrusion response, if X is located in a quarantined area, it
interrupts all active route which it is part of. If X is part of a route from a source S to a destination D, X
informs S by sending a corresponding route error message. Thus, intrusion response is non-transparent
in that S is aware of the route break and is in duty to find a new route to D, as shown in Figure 5.2a.
Only packets that are in flight or still sent by S until the route error message arrives are handed to the
Bundle Layer of X for later retransmissions.
For the delay tolerant extension of the location-based intrusion response mechanism, we, additionally,
introduce a transparent alternative in which X does not inform S that the route is affected by a misbe-
having node. Thus, the route is not interrupted and X hands all packets arriving from S to the Bundle
Layer for retransmission. In the transparent case, X is fully responsible for finding a new route to D and
retransmitting packets appropriately as soon as it has left the quarantined area, as shown in Figure 5.2b.
(a) Non-transparent intrusion response (b) Transparent intrusion response
Figure 5.2: Schematic representation of transparent and non-transparent intrusion response
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5.2 Evaluation
The main goal of the evaluation is to quantify the trade-off between transmission delay and packet
delivery ratio. We show a comparison of the performance of the location-based intrusion response
with and without being supported by the Bundle Layer. We consider the four possible combinations of
transparent/non-transparent intrusion response and buffered/unbuffered intrusion detection. The eval-
uation is based on a series of simulation studies performed with the (further extended) JiST/MobNet
simulation tool [56]. Unless specified otherwise, we use the metrics and configurations described in
Section 3.2.
5.2.1 Metrics for the Evaluation
To identify the effects caused by harnessing delay tolerance, we modify the metrics of overall packet loss,
overall delivery ratios, and overall transmission delay with respect to the definition in Section 3.2.3. For
the evaluation of the delay-tolerant approach, we independently monitor the results with and without
retransmissions of the Bundle Layer.
5.2.2 Experimental Design
Based on preliminary simulations, we defined the parameters and factors used for the evaluation such
that the system operates within normal bounds.
Parameters
The parameters used for the simulation studies that differ from those used for the evaluation of the
first approach for location-based intrusion response in Section 3.2.8, are defined in Table 5.1. As for
the evaluation of the adaptive transmission power in the previous chapter, we fixed the number of
misbehaving nodes to 10, thus considering the worst-case scenario of the evaluation of the first version
of location-based intrusion response. Since we observed congestion situations in some scenarios, which
we discuss in detail in the following, we reduced the network load to 10 streams running simultaneously.
Again, the quarantine time is fixed to t reset = 300s which turned out to be the optimal choice.
Table 5.1: Network parameters as used in the simulation studies
Total number of nodes 1000
Benign nodes 990
Black hole nodes 10
Traffic pattern Constant bitrate traffic with streams of 2048 bytes per
second split in 4 packets per second. 10 streams run in
parallel with a duration of 30 seconds each. Streams
are set up uniformly within the first 30 seconds of sim-
ulated time. After this, every time a stream ends, a new
one is created immediately. Source and destination are
randomly selected from the set of benign nodes, result-
ing in that malicious nodes are not chosen as source or
destination.
Quarantine time t reset 300s
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Factors
The factors that considerably affect system performance are the number nret rans of retransmission at-
tempts performed by the Bundle Layer per packet and the interval t ret rans between two consecutive
retransmission attempts. The values used in the evaluation are defined in Table 5.2. We performed a
full-factorial simulation study for all combinations possible of buffered/unbuffered intrusion detection
system and transparent/non-transparent intrusion response.
Table 5.2: Factors as used in the simulation studies
Number nret rans of retransmission attempts by the Bun-
dle Layer
4, 16, 32
Interval t ret rans between two consecutive retransmis-
sions
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60
5.2.3 Analysis of the Results
We now discuss the results of the simulation studies. All plots are given with 95% confidence intervals.
Note that, for reasons of readability, we condensed the results to bar charts for all metrics that were not
statistically significantly affected by the factors defined in Table 5.2.
Packet Loss Caused by Black Holes
Figure 5.3 shows the packet loss caused by black holes. Note that this metric includes all packets dropped
by black holes, also those that are recovered in case of a buffered intrusion detection system. We decided
not to include these retransmissions in this metric to keep the results comparable to those obtained pre-
viously for the first version of location-based intrusion response and for the intrusion response supported
by adaptive transmission power.
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Figure 5.3: Packet loss caused by black holes
The baseline to which we have to compare the results is given by the loss of about 13% observed for
an unbuffered intrusion detection system with a non-transparent intrusion response. This combination
corresponds to the first version of location-based intrusion response presented in Chapter 3 and the loss
observed matches the results obtained previously.
We observe that the loss for the non-transparent intrusion response combined with a buffered intru-
sion detection is slightly but statistically significantly lower than the baseline. This is due to a slight
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overload situation that occurred for this combination, which can be seen from the increased loss caused
by exhausted queuing space shown in Figure 5.6; packets that get lost on the way to a black hole due to
network congestion cannot be dropped by the black hole itself anymore.
What stands out is that the loss observed for a transparent intrusion response, combined with both
buffered and unbuffered intrusion detection, is considerably lower than the baseline and than the loss
observed for non-transparent intrusion response with buffered intrusion detection. This can be explained
by the increased false positive rate, shown in Figure 5.10, that occurred for these combinations. If false
positives occur in proximity to a black hole, the black hole is surrounded by quarantined areas that still
prevent the black hole from getting active, although it might have already left the quarantined area that
was established at its original location.
Packet Loss Caused by Inherent Network Properties
The packet loss caused by inherent network properties is shown in Figure 5.4 as sum of loss caused by
collisions shown in Figure 5.5, loss caused by exhausted queuing space shown in Figure 5.6, and loss
caused by the routing protocol due to route breaks or unreachable destinations shown in Figure 5.7.
Like the metric of loss caused by black holes, all of these metrics do not consider retransmissions of
the Bundle Layer for reasons of comparability. The baseline is again given by the results obtained for
unbuffered intrusion detection with non-transparent intrusion response. For this case, the results match
those observed in Chapter 3.
Compared to the baseline, the loss caused by inherent network properties is slightly higher for a
transparent intrusion response combined with both buffered and unbuffered intrusion detection. This
is due to an increased loss caused by the routing protocol for these combinations, as shown in Figure
5.7. This, in turn, can be explained by the increased false positive rate of the intrusion detection system
shown in Figure 5.10. An increased false positive rate leads to an increased number of quarantined
benign nodes and, thus, to an increased loss due to route breaks or unreachable destinations. As a
direct consequence, the loss caused by collisions and the loss caused by exhausted queuing space for a
transparent intrusion response is slightly lower than the baseline. If less packets are sent through the
network due to unreachable destinations, less collisions occur and queuing load is reduced.
It stands out that the inherent loss for a non-transparent intrusion response with a buffered intrusion
detection is considerably higher than the inherent loss observed for all other combinations. From the
packet loss caused by exhausted queuing space shown in Figure 5.6, we learn that this is due to a
slight overload situation of the network. The overload leads to an increased loss caused by the routing
protocol due to route request or route reply messages that are dropped if queuing space is exhausted. As
a consequence, routes cannot be established and packet loss occurs due to unreachable destinations.
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Figure 5.4: Packet loss caused by inherent network properties
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Figure 5.5: Packet loss caused by collisions on the wireless medium
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Figure 5.6: Packet loss caused by exhausted queuing space in the network interface
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Figure 5.7: Packet loss caused by the AODV routing protocol
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Packet Loss Caused by and Performance of Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Response
The packet loss caused by location-based intrusion response due to quarantined benign nodes is shown
in Figure 5.8. The baseline is given again by the loss observed for the combination of non-transparent
intrusion response and unbuffered intrusion detection. Retransmissions by the Bundle Layer are not
considered.
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Figure 5.8: Packet loss caused by intrusion response
Regarding detection performance of the intrusion detection system, we did not observe any vari-
ations of statistical significance subject to the different combinations of transparent/non-transparent
intrusion response and buffered/unbuffered intrusion detection, as shown in Figure 5.9. Therefore,
equal preconditions apply for all schemes.
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Figure 5.9: Detection rate of the intrusion detection system
We expected a slightly lower loss caused by intrusion response for the non-transparent approach with
buffered intrusion detection due to the slight overload caused by this combination. In analogy to the
reasons given for the loss caused by black holes, packets that get lost on their way to a quarantined
area due to network overload do not affect the loss caused due to the quarantined area itself anymore.
Yet, we observe that the loss caused by intrusion response for a non-transparent intrusion response
with a buffered intrusion detection does not differ from the baseline. This can be explained by the
slightly increased false positive rate for this combination shown in Figure 5.10c. False positives cause an
increased number of quarantined areas which, in turn, cause an increased loss due to intrusion response.
Altogether, the reduced loss due to network overload and the increased loss due to false positives balance
out each other. The slightly increased false positive rate also results from the slight overload situation,
which increases packet loss caused by inherent network properties as explained in the previous section.
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If this loss exceeds the classification threshold thresblack of the intrusion detection system, false positives
occur.
Compared to the baseline loss of about 15%, the loss for transparent intrusion response with both
buffered and unbuffered intrusion detection is considerably higher at about 40%. The main reason
for this is that, in the transparent approaches, the sender is not informed when a route is affected by
misbehavior. Instead, all packets are buffered at the first quarantined node. Since we want to maintain
comparability of the results, these packets are considered lost before they are retransmitted by the Bundle
Layer. Thus, not only packets in flight while a route error message travels back to the sender, but all
packets that belong to a stream affected by misbehavior are considered lost in the first step. This effect
is further amplified by an increased false positive rate for the transparent intrusion response schemes
which can be seen in Figures 5.10b and 5.10d. The increased false positive rate, in case of transparent
intrusion response, is a drawback of the simplified intrusion detection system that works based on local
information only. No information is exchanged to support monitoring the forwarding behavior of other
nodes. Thus, a quarantined benign node that does not forward, but buffers packets, may be classified as
black hole by a node that is not aware of the corresponding quarantined area.
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Figure 5.10: False positive rate of the intrusion detection system
Regarding the false positive rate of the transparent intrusion response schemes shown in Figures 5.10b
and 5.10d, it further stands out that the false positive rate decreases if the number of retransmission at-
tempts increases and if the time between two consecutive retransmission attempts increases. We put
this down to the fact that, in the transparent schemes, packets are stored and forwarded in the network.
If we further consider the routing metric of AODV, which prefers short routes, it follows that packets
get closer to their destination with each retransmission attempt. Also, if we increase the time between
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consecutive retransmission attempts, the probability for a quarantined benign node having left the quar-
antined area and, thus, being able to transmit successfully increases. Now, if packets get closer to the
destination with increasing number of retransmissions and increasing time between consecutive retrans-
missions, the probability for a route to the destination being affected by misbehavior decreases due to
the expanding ring search of AODV. If the destination is located in a ring closer to the source than the
next misbehaving node, the route request will not reach the misbehaving node and the route can be
established successfully. Finally, if the probability for routes being affected by misbehavior decreases, the
probability for false positive classifications of quarantined benign nodes also decreases.
Overall Packet Loss and Delivery Ratios
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Figure 5.11: Overall packet loss without retransmissions of the bundle layer
The overall packet loss without considering the retransmissions of the Bundle Layer is shown in Figure
5.11. The baseline given by the loss observed for the non-transparent intrusion response with unbuffered
intrusion detection corresponds to the loss observed for the first version of location-based intrusion
response presented in Chapter 3. Due to the slight overload situation, the overall loss is slightly increased
for the non-transparent intrusion response with buffered intrusion detection. Since packets buffered by
intermediate nodes are considered lost if we do not take into account retransmissions, the overall packet
loss without retransmissions is considerably higher for the transparent intrusion response schemes.
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Figure 5.12: Overall delivery ratio without retransmissions of the bundle layer
To verify the correctness of the result, we additionally monitor the packet delivery ratio without re-
transmissions of the Bundle Layer shown in Figure 5.12. Since packet delivery is monitored indepen-
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dently from packet loss and the results for packet loss and packet delivery match, we conclude the
correctness of the implementation and of the results presented.
If we take into account the retransmissions of the Bundle Layer, the results change considerably, as
shown in Figures 5.13 and 5.14. To interpret the results, we always have to consider both loss and
delivery ratios.
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Figure 5.13: Overall packet loss after retransmissions of the bundle layer
We observe a packet loss reduced to zero for the non-transparent and transparent intrusion response
with unbuffered intrusion detection if the maximum number of retransmissions and the time between
consecutive retransmissions is chosen appropriately, as shown in Figures 5.13a and 5.13b. Yet, if we
consider the corresponding packet delivery ratios shown in Figures 5.14a and 5.14b, we clearly observe
delivery ratios below 100%. We put this down to packets still being buffered by the Bundle Layer at
the end of the simulated time. These packet were neither dropped nor delivered, thus affecting neither
packet loss nor delivery ratios.
On the other hand, if we compare loss and delivery ratios for the non-transparent and transparent
intrusion response with buffered intrusion detection, we find that loss and delivery ratios match, as
shown in Figures 5.13c and 5.13d and in Figures 5.14c and 5.14d, respectively. Thus, all packets are
either delivered or finally dropped by the Bundle Layer at the end of the simulated time.
The interpretation above is supported by the transmission delay observed if retransmissions of the Bun-
dle Layer are included in the calculation, as shown in Figure 5.19. We see that the average transmission
delay is considerably higher if a buffered intrusion detection system is used.
Comparing the loss observed for a low number of retransmissions and a short time between con-
secutive retransmissions, we observe higher values for the transparent than for the non-transparent
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approaches. This is caused by the fact that more packets have to be handled by the Bundle Layer when
a transparent intrusion response is used. Thus, more packets are finally dropped by the Bundle Layer if
the maximum number of retransmissions per packet is exceeded.
The unsteady trend and the large confidence intervals we observe for both packet loss and delivery
ratios shown in Figures 5.13c and 5.14c can be explained by the slight overload situation that is caused
by this combination.
Altogether, we have to emphasize that we are able to increase the packet delivery ratio to more than
90% in case of the transparent intrusion response with a buffered intrusion detection, if appropriate
values for the number of retransmissions and the time between consecutive retransmissions are chosen.
Recall that the packet delivery ratio in a network without intrusion detection and response is less than
10% for an equal number of misbehaving nodes.
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Figure 5.14: Overall delivery ratio including retransmissions of the bundle layer
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Route Lengths
The average route length observed for all combinations of transparent/non-transparent intrusion re-
sponse and buffered/unbuffered intrusion detection is shown in Figure 5.15. The baseline given by
non-transparent intrusion response combined with unbuffered intrusion detection matches the results
presented in Chapter 3 for the first version of location-based intrusion response.
Routes are marginally longer for the transparent intrusion response schemes, which is due to the
increased false positive rates of the intrusion detection system, we observe in these scenarios. Increased
false positives lead to an increased number of quarantined areas that have to be bypassed by routes.
Thus, we obtain slightly longer routes for a transparent intrusion response.
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Figure 5.15: Route length
Network Delays
The transmission delays from sending application to receiving application without retransmissions of the
bundle layer are shown in Figure 5.16.
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Figure 5.16: Transmission delay from application to application without retransmissions of the bundle layer
Both factors of the transmission delay, the routing delay on the source node and the propagation delay
of the network without retransmissions, are shown in Figures 5.17 and 5.18. The baseline given by the
delay for non-transparent intrusion response with unbuffered intrusion detection is slightly lower than
the delay observed in the first version of location-based intrusion response discussed in Section 3.2.9.
This is due to the traffic load which is reduced from 20 to 10 streams running in parallel. If less packets
are in flight at a point in time, the queuing delay on each node of a multi-hop route decreases. Thus,
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both data packets and routing messages experience a lower delay, resulting in both a decreased routing
delay and a decreased propagation delay.
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Figure 5.17: Routing delay on source node without retransmissions of the bundle layer
Compared to the baseline, the delays observed for non-transparent intrusion response with buffered
intrusion detection are higher which is due to the slight overload situation for this combination.
The delays experienced for transparent intrusion response with both unbuffered and buffered intrusion
detection are also increased compared to the baseline. We put this down to an increased network
load which is caused by the fact that the number of traffic sources is increased when using transparent
intrusion response due the increased false positive rate of the intrusion detection system. The effect
starts at the first node that detects a misbehaving node. Since the detecting node does not send a route
error, but buffers (thus, not forwards) arriving packets, the detecting node may be falsely classified as
black hole, as discussed earlier in this section. With each false positive, a new node buffers packets and,
thus, becomes a traffic source as soon as it is not quarantined any more.
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Figure 5.18: Propagation delay from source to destination without retransmissions of the bundle layer
The transmission delay from sending application to receiving application including retransmissions of
the bundle layer is shown in Figure 5.19. The lowest delay is observed for non-transparent intrusion
response with unbuffered intrusion detection. Compared to all other combinations, in this case, the
lowest number of packets has to buffered and retransmitted. Only packets sent to quarantined benign
nodes until the source receives the route error are affected. Following this reasoning, the delays observed
increase along with the number of packets that are handled by the Bundle Layer. The maximum delays,
up to about five minutes, are observed for a transparent intrusion response with buffered intrusion
detection, where the highest number of packets is handled by the Bundle Layer. The large confidence
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intervals we observe for non-transparent intrusion response with buffered intrusion detection are due to
the slight overload situation caused by this combination.
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Figure 5.19: Transmission delay from application to application including retransmissions of the bundle layer
5.3 Conclusion - Delay Tolerance
In this chapter, we discussed how artificial transmission delays can be used to support the location-based
intrusion response in mobile ad hoc networks. By delaying transmissions and retransmissions appropri-
ately, we enable communication of quarantined benign nodes. The evaluation of the different strategies
for buffering and retransmitting packets showed that we are able to nearly recover the performance of a
clean network with respect to the ratio of packets delivered. The price we have to pay for this is a consid-
erably increased transmission delay. Thus, the approach can be deployed for delay tolerant applications
such as e-mail or short message services but is infeasible for real-time communication.
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6 Basics and Related Work on Security in Peer-to-Peer Systems
In this chapter, we shortly introduce building blocks of peer-to-peer systems. For a more comprehensive
introduction, we refer to [102]. We present basic and recent related work on security that influenced
our research. We focus on related work on threshold cryptography and applications of threshold cryp-
tography in peer-to-peer systems. For a broader overview on security in peer-to-peer systems, we refer
to [110, 102].
6.1 General Network Model
We consider a spontaneously established peer-to-peer network without central, trusted instances and
security policies. We assume that users are involved in security related decisions such as authentication
and access control. We focus on finding a set of users that are authorized to take part in security-related
decisions and on mapping the decision process to the network.
We assume that the delay introduced by involving users in decision is in orders of magnitude higher
than delays introduced by the network or by means of cryptography. We, thus, neglect network and
computation delays. We demand that a decision process should be completed within one round. That is,
after one request-reply cycle, a decision should be found.
Regarding the peer-to-peer system, we demand a reliable and deterministic lookup process, that is,
assuming a lossless network, a lookup for a particular service or user available in the peer-to-peer system
should be successful as soon as the service or the user is available in the system.
6.2 Foundations
In contrast to client/server systems, where the roles of service provider and service consumer are sepa-
rated strictly, peers in a peer-to-peer system act as both service provider and service consumer. This way,
the application layer of a communication network can be established spontaneously, without the need of
setting up central instances. A core challenge in peer-to-peer systems (and in communication networks
in general) is to lookup a requested service, that is, to determine the network address at which the ser-
vice can be reached. In client/server systems, this task is performed by centralized service directories
such as the domain name system or web search engines. During the evolution peer-to-peer systems have
undergone in the last years, several approaches for service lookup were proposed. For our needs, these
approaches can be used to categorize peer-to-peer systems into centralized, pure, hybrid, and structured
peer-to-peer systems.
In centralized peer-to-peer systems, a central instance is responsible for service lookup. A service
provider registers the service at the central instance. A service consumer can perform a service lookup
by contacting the central instance. In large-scale, Internet-based peer-to-peer systems, this approach
introduces challenges regarding scalability due to a potentially high traffic and computing load of the
central instance. In our scenario, where the peer-to-peer system is established on top of a mobile ad hoc
network, the central instance may become disconnected, thus rendering service lookup impossible.
In pure peer-to-peer systems, service lookup is, in general, performed by broadcasting a lookup request
to all peers in the overlay. This approach may cause overload situations and result in an unreliable, non-
deterministic lookup process [102].
To overcome the limitations of pure peer-to-peer approaches, hybrid systems introduce a two-tier
architecture for service lookup, thus combining advantages of centralized and pure peer-to-peer systems.
For this, a a set of dedicated peers, which usually have high resources, is responsible for service lookup.
When joining a peer-to-peer system, each ’normal’ peer connects to a dedicated peer at which it registers
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available services. Lookup requests are sent to the dedicated peer which contacts other dedicated peers
if the service requested is not registered at itself. While the traffic and computing load caused by lookup
requests can be reduced this way, still, the lookup process remains non-deterministic. Due to load
limitation strategies, a lookup request may not reach the dedicated peer, at which a service is registered.
In structured peer-to-peer systems, each peer is responsible for the lookup information of a subset
of the services available in the system. For this, peers and services share a common address space. A
peer offering a service registers the service at a peer with an address closest to the service description.
Taking the high-level analogy of a phone book, services with descriptions from ’aardvark’ to ’azure’ are
registered at Peer ’a’, et cetera. Lookup requests are directed to the peer with the address closest to
the service description, resulting in a deterministic lookup process. That is, a lookup request will be
successful as soon as the requested service is available in the peer-to-peer system. Note that, in our
scenario, this only holds if the mobile ad hoc network is not partitioned, that is, if the peers involved in
service lookup are not disconnected from the network.
Recently, for example in [82, 18, 57], architectures for structured peer-to-peer systems that are tailored
to the challenging conditions of mobile ad hoc networks were proposed. Yet, we do not focus on the
challenge of implementing a structured peer-to-peer system on top of a mobile ad hoc network in the
following. Further, the models and tools developed for user-based cooperative decisions in peer-to-peer
systems do not depend on a particular implementation of a peer-to-peer overlay. Also, due to the lack
of a mobile peer-to-peer testbed of appropriate size, the evaluation presented in the next chapter is
based on wired, static testbeds. Without loss of generality, we thus decided to use the Pastry structured
peer-to-peer overlay [88] described below as basis for our experiments.
6.2.1 Pastry
Pastry [88] is a representative of structured peer-to-peer systems. Service lookup in Pastry is based on a
circular address space, with n bit addresses. Commonly, n= 128 is chosen. Both peers and services are
addressed in this address space. Service addresses are maintained by the peer with the address closest
to the particular service address.
To route lookup requests to the responsible peer, each node maintains a prefix-based routing table
which consists of n · 2−b rows and 2b columns, where 2b is the base in which addresses are expressed
numerically. Commonly, b=4 is chosen. In Row r of the routing table, known peers with an address
matching the first r bits of the node maintaining the routing table are stored. This results in a routing
table that is dense in the logical neighborhood of a peer and sparse for distant parts of the address space,
as shown schematically in Figure 6.1. The metric used for populating the routing table takes into account
the physical distance of peers, determined, for example, by the round trip time.
Figure 6.1: Schematic representation of Pastry’s routing table for b = 2. Note that the number of rows does not
match the specification for reasons of presentation.
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In addition to the routing table, nodes maintain a neighborhood set and a leafset. The neighborhood
set contains peers that are close with respect to the routing metric, that is, physically close peers. The
leafset contains peers that are close with respect to peer addresses, that is, logically close peers. The
leafset typically consists of 24 peers. Both neighborhood set and leafset are used to improve routing
performance in that a lookup request is preferably forwarded to nodes logically closer to the requested
service address based on either the neighborhood set or the leafset. The routing table is used if no
appropriate node is found in the neighborhood set or the leafset.
6.2.2 Scribe
Scribe [16] enables application layer multicast communication in Pastry peer-to-peer systems. Peers can
flexibly create, join, and leave multicast groups. For each group, a common multicast tree is established
and used to forward multicast messages. In analogy to Pastry’s addressing scheme, the peer with the
address closest to the name of the multicast group acts as entry point, that is, as root of the multicast
tree. To send a multicast message to a group, the message is first sent to the entry point and, from there,
forwarded along the multicast tree.
A peer that wants to join a multicast group sends a corresponding join message to the entry point of
the group using the routing mechanism of Pastry. Each peer that forwards the join message adds the
peer from which it received the message to the set of its children in the corresponding multicast tree if it
is not included already. This process is stopped as soon as a peer, from which a join message is received,
is already included in the set of child peers or if the join message reaches the entry point.
If a peer leaves a tree, a leave message is sent upwards the tree, pruning all branches that are not
required anymore, that is, all branches that were needed to reach the leaving peer only.
Tree maintenance is performed in a proactive way. For this, heartbeat messages are sent periodically
through the tree. Nodes that do not receive heartbeat messages for a tree they are part of send a new
join message, thus repairing the tree. To handle failing entry points, their functionality is replicated to
logical neighbors. This way, the routing mechanism of Pastry takes care of reaching the new entry point
in case of a failure.
6.3 Related Work on Threshold Signatures
The mathematical foundation behind achieving joint decisions can be provided by threshold signatures.
The idea of threshold signatures was first described in [95]. The mode of operation is based on a
(private) signature key K that is split up into a set of partial keys Ki with i ∈ {1, ...,n}. For this, a
polynomial q(x) is chosen such that K = q(0) applies. The partial keys then correspond to values of q(x)
at specific indexes, that is Ki = q(i) where i 6= 0. The application scenario considered in [95] includes a
trusted signing device that collects partial keys whenever a signature has to be produced. By Lagrange
interpolation, the trusted device can compute the full signature key and produce a valid signature if
enough partial keys are collected. Thereby, ’enough’ is defined by the degree of the chosen polynomial
q(x).
The availability of a trusted signing device can not be assumed in our highly dynamic peer-to-peer sce-
nario. For such environments threshold signature schemes which do not interpolate keys but signatures
were proposed. Every peer Pi that is authorized to take part in a joint decision receives a partial key Ki.
If, for example, a certificate C which allows for the access to restricted services of a closed user group has
to be signed, each peer that holds a partial key Ki may issue a certificate with a partial signature Si. By
Lagrange interpolation, the peer that has requested access can interpolate the full signature S from the
partial signatures if a sufficient number of partial signatures is received (that is, if sufficient authorized
peers decided to grant access).
For our needs, we have to differentiate between interactive and non-interactive threshold cryptogra-
phy schemes. Unlike non-interactive approaches, interactive ones require communication (in possibly
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multiple rounds) between the peers that want to issue partially signed certificates. We illustrate this
point using a simplified example of threshold RSA signatures. A ’standard’ RSA signature S(m) of a
message m is produced by calculating
S(m) = md mod N
where d is the private exponent and N is the RSA modulus. When threshold RSA signatures are used,
d is split up in a set of partial exponents di. In interactive approaches, the partial signature Si(m) of Peer
Pi is calculated as
Si(m) = m
di ·Li mod N
where Li is the Lagrange factor of Pi with
Li =
k∏
j=0, j 6=i
−x j
x i − x j
Subsequently, each Peer Pi needs to know the indexes of all other k− 1 peers Pj 6=i that provide partial
signatures so as to be able to calculate Li. In order to obtain this knowledge, the peers involved have
to exchange their indexes. This further implies that a full signature cannot be interpolated if a partial
signature is lost or if a peer does not provide its partial signature within a reasonable amount of time. In
this case, a new request has to be sent since the partial signatures are only valid in the signature group
for which the Lagrange factors have been calculated.
Due to the restrictions introduced by involving users in the decision process that may not be able to
provide a decision in a reasonable time, interactive threshold cryptography approaches are not suitable
for our application scenario. Appropriate non-interactive approaches are presented, for example, in
[96, 21]. Here, the generation of a partial signature has been modified such that knowledge on the
indexes of the other peers contributing partial signatures is not required. This property is paid for by
the loss of other functionality offered by interactive threshold signature schemes. As an example, in
[96] a trusted dealer that generates and distributes the partial keys is assumed, whereas other threshold
signature schemes allow for the distributed calculation of the keyshares. In our application scenario this
does not pose a problem. The distribution of the partial keys can be performed a priori, within a secure
environment (for example, by cell phone operators) where a trusted dealer is available. A more detailed
discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this thesis. For our scenario, gaining the advantage of
non-interactivity is worth the price of loosing other features.
A signature S that was produced by threshold cryptography does not reveal anything about the partial
keys Ki that were used. Thus, no information about the peers that were involved in a joint decision
can be deduced from a signature. Also a restriction to a subset of the shareholders is not possible. For
some scenarios, it may be necessary to identify single peers that were involved in a joint decision or to
define additional restrictions to decide which peers are allowed to take part in a joint decision. In this
case, multisignatures can be used instead of threshold cryptography as the basic technique. Here, every
authorized peer owns a (full) signature key which is uniquely bound to its identity. A simple multisig-
nature scheme would be to form a signature by the concatenation of the identities and the signatures of
the signers. However, this scheme would cause the size, as well as the computing time required for the
verification of a signature to grow linearly with the number of signers. Since the bandwidth available
and the computing power of devices may be restricted in our scenario, this simple multisignature scheme
does not meet our requirements. More complex schemes produce compressed signatures without the loss
of information. Here, again we have to differentiate between interactive and non-interactive schemes.
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In analogy to the reasons provided in the context of threshold cryptography, interactive multisignature
schemes are not appropriate for our application scenario. A suitable non-interactive scheme has been
proposed, for example, in [11].
A drawback of applying public key cryptography in resource constraint networks is that certificates
have to be exchanged to learn public keys of communication partners. This poses a data overhead
for a bandwidth constraint network. To avoid this data overhead, the cryptosystem can be made self-
contained, meaning that each node is preloaded with the public keys of all other nodes. This, on the
other hand, may cause a significant memory overhead for resource constraint devices. A mechanism for
self-contained key management in resource constraint ad hoc networks is proposed in [34]. To reduce
memory overhead, nodes are identified by a particular set of private keys, thus decreasing the overall
number of public/private keypairs required.
6.4 Related Work on Applying Threshold Cryptography in Peer-to-Peer Systems
In [73], the authors compare different threshold signature schemes with respect to their performance
in controlling access to closed user groups within peer-to-peer systems. Performance is measured in
terms of basic operation costs, that is, the time needed to produce partial signatures, and join time, that
is, the amount of time a new peer needs to join a closed user group. User interactions, as required in
our application scenario, are not considered. Non-interactive signature schemes which we assume to
be the most promising variant of threshold signatures for our application scenario are not part of this
evaluation. The analysis of [73] is extended to fit additional signature schemes in [90].
In [62] and [63], a protocol for access control in mobile ad hoc networks using interactive threshold
cryptography is proposed. The protocol is based upon localized joint authentication within the geograph-
ical neighborhood of a node. The performance of the approach proposed is evaluated (amongst other
metrics) regarding the probability that an authentication request is successful, that is, whether a suffi-
cient number of partially signed certificates has been received to be able to interpolate a full signature.
Stochastic models for this success probability are not proposed. The protocol is proven to be susceptible
to attacks in [47].
A non-interactive mechanism for access control to mobile ad hoc networks is proposed in [91] and
[116]. In contrast to [96], which we identified as a threshold signature scheme that is applicable in our
application scenario, the protocol proposed in [91] and [116] is not based on a cryptographic key that
is shared among multiple parties, but on bivariate polynomials that can be used to establish pairwise
shared secret keys. A performance evaluation comparable to [73] and [90] has been carried out. User
interactions are not considered. Because ’standard’ signed certificates as required in our scenario cannot
be produced with this approach, we did not choose [91] as a possible cryptographic mechanism.
6.5 Related Work on Analytical Models for Peer-to-Peer Systems
A large variety of related work on analytical models for peer-to-peer systems exists. Mostly, the peer-
to-peer system itself is considered by modeling metrics such as network load, computational load, and
quality of service parameters.
In [51], the authors develop a model for controlling the node degree of peers in a pure peer-to-peer
system. The model aims at describing the trade-off between traffic overhead experienced by individual
nodes that is caused by lookup operations and content availability, that is, the probability that a service
available in the peer-to-peer system can be found. By adjusting the node degree, both factors can be
balanced.
Effects of up and downscaling peer-to-peer filesharing systems are described analytically in [61]. Met-
rics like content availability, lookup delays, and transmission delays subject to the size of the peer-to-peer
system are considered. The model is tailored to hybrid peer-to-peer systems.
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Scalability and performance of structured peer-to-peer systems are modeled in [111]. The focus is set
on evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of building a structured peer-to-peer system upon few highly
available nodes with rich resources or upon many nodes with potentially restricted resources that join
and leave the peer-to-peer system frequently, thus causing a large amount of maintenance traffic.
The effects of churn, that is, peers frequently joining and leaving, on a structured peer-to-peer system
are further studied in [55]. The focus is set on calculating the probability of a partitioned overlay.
The model developed in [58] describes the effects of caches for peer-to-peer traffic installed at service
providers. The focus is set on modeling the traffic that crosses domains of Internet service providers
caused by peer-to-peer systems.
A model describing the computational load and the network load of peer-to-peer streaming systems
is proposed in [17]. By taking into account the topology of the underlay network, the model is tailored
to proximity-based streaming systems. That is, the model describes the scalability of streaming solutions
that select peers from which to download based on the physical proximity of the peers in the underlay
network.
In [120], a model for controlling the scheduling of data chunks in peer-to-peer streaming systems is
proposed. The goal of the model is to provide a means for describing the trade-off between spreading
data chunks within the peer-to-peer system to increase scalability and delivering content to a particular
peer to increase quality of experience in terms of playback smoothness.
An analysis of different variants of authentication protocols with respect to lower bounds of mes-
sage overhead generated and communication rounds required is performed in [26]. Protocols based on
threshold signatures are not considered. Thus, stochastic models for different interaction schemes in a
joint process are not proposed.
To the best of our knowledge, stochastic models that describe different interaction schemes for user-
based joint decisions based on non-interactive threshold signature mechanisms, which are the focus of
our work, were not proposed.
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7 User-based Cooperative Decisions in Peer-to-Peer Systems
In this chapter, we present the concept of user-based cooperative decisions. Figure 7.1 shows a schematic
representation of a cooperative decision process based on threshold cryptography using the example of
access control to a restricted resource. In Step 1, the user that requires access to the resource sends
a corresponding request to a set of peers that are authorized for deciding on security-related requests,
that is, that hold keyshares. In Step 2, each peer requested involves its user in the decision process.
The request is presented in a human-readable form to the user, who may, if he/she is not otherwise
engaged, agree to granting access. In this case, the peer sends a certificate partially signed with the
peer’s keyshare back to the requesting peer. In Step 3, the partially signed certificates can be combined
to a fully signed certificate if a sufficiently large number is collected. This way, user-based cooperative
decision offer an alternative to central, trusted instances for building the fundament of security services
like authentication and access control.
Figure 7.1: Schematic representation of a cooperative decision based on threshold cryptography
In the following, we first discuss schemes for the interaction of a peer that request a security-related
decision with the peers that are involved in the decision process. Based on this, we develop stochastic
models describing the success probability of of a decision process subject to the particular interaction
scheme. We consider a decision process successful, if the requesting peer receives a sufficiently large
number of partially signed certificates to be able to compute a fully signed certificate. We verify the
models developed with a prototypic implementation of user-based cooperative decisions in the PlanetLab
[80] and the G-Lab [19] testbeds.
7.1 Architecture
As shown in Figure 7.1, a peer that issues a security-related request has to send this request to a set of
peers that hold keyshares and, thus, are authorized to take part in a decision process. The strategy for
disseminating the request within the peer-to-peer system directly affects the number of users requested
and the probability of receiving enough partially signed certificates to be able to interpolate a full sig-
nature. In the following, we describe different interaction schemes between requesting peers and peers
that (potentially) contribute to the decision process. We take into account different levels of knowledge
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about which peers hold keyshares. We shortly explain how the interaction schemes can be realized in a
Pastry peer-to-peer overlay, which will be the basis for the testbed evaluation. However, the interaction
schemes proposed in the following are independent from the particular peer-to-peer system and hold for
structured as well as for unstructured or hybrid systems.
7.1.1 Interaction Scheme for Known Shareholders
If we assume knowledge on the distribution of keyshares and on whether the corresponding authorized
users are available for contributing to a decision process, we can harness this knowledge to coordinate
the dissemination of requests.
This can be done, for example, by a peer that acts as mediator for the decision process. The mediator
keeps track of the status of authorized peers/users and accepts and relays requests appropriately, as
shown in Figure 7.2.
As an alternative, the mediation can be implemented based on Scribe multicast groups. Peers that hold
keyshares, with users ready to contribute to a decision process, subscribe to a corresponding multicast
group. Requests are sent to this group along with the requested number of partial signatures.
Figure 7.2: Schematic representation of the interaction scheme with known shareholders
7.1.2 Interaction Scheme for Unknown Shareholders
If no knowledge on which peers hold keyshares is available, broadcasting the request within the en-
tire peer-to-peer system would be a straightforward interaction scheme. In this case, all users holding
keyshares are contacted. Thus, in case the decision is positive, a broadcast would result in the highest
probability for a decision request to be successful (that is, for receiving enough partially signed certifi-
cates to be able to interpolate a fully signed certificate). Yet, due to the high number of users involved
that is caused by a broadcast in the peer-to-peer overlay, the applicability of a broadcast is limited in our
scenario. Instead, a multicast approach is reasonable. We assume that the multicast is initiated by the
requesting peer and that the requesting peer has no knowledge about which peers hold keyshares.
One way to realize a multicast is to send requests to a set of randomly selected peer IDs, as shown in
Figure 7.3. Regarding the implementation in a Pastry peer-to-peer system, if an ID is not used, Pastry
will route the request to the peer with the ID closest to the one selected.
Another multicast approach that can be applied if the shareholders are unknown to the requesting
peer is based on gossiping the request among neighbor peers, as shown in Figure 7.4. In this case, the
definition of neighbors depends on the metrics of the particular peer-to-peer system deployed. For Pastry,
we implemented a forwarding based on the leafset. A requesting peer sends the request to the peers in
its leafset. Each peer that receives the request again forwards the request to the logically most distant
peer in its leafset. To limit the propagation of the request, a counter indicating the required number
of partial signatures is contained in the request message. The peer that initiates the request sets the
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Figure 7.3: Schematic representation of the interaction scheme for unknown shareholders. Requests are sent to
randomly selected peer IDs.
counter to the total number of partial signatures required divided by the number of peers in its leafset.
Each shareholder that receives the request decreases the counter appropriately. Request messages with
an expired counter are dropped.
Figure 7.4: Schematic representation of the interaction scheme for unknown shareholders. Requests are gossiped
to neighbor peers.
7.2 Stochastic Analysis of the Decision Process
In this section, we develop stochastic models that describe the success probability psucc of a cooperative
decision process subject to the interaction schemes described in the previous section. A request is con-
sidered successful if a sufficient number of partially signed certificates is received such that a fully signed
certificate can be interpolated. The number of partially signed certificates received is sufficient if it is
greater or equal to the threshold nthres that is defined by the threshold cryptography scheme deployed.
Table 7.1 provides an overview on the notation we use in the following.
We provide graphical examples of the models using a scenario that consists of ntotal = 100 peers of
which nke ys = 15 hold keyshares. The probability prep that a peer holding a keyshare contributes to a
decision process in a reasonable time is assumed to be 95%. With these values given, we show how
nthres and nreq affect the success probability psucc. Please note that the values are chosen for visualization
purposes such that the system operates in reasonable bounds. The stochastic models are independent
from this particular instantiation.
7.2.1 Model of the Interaction Scheme for Known Shareholders
For the interaction scheme with known shareholders, the probability p(nrep) of receiving a certain num-
ber nrep of replies to a request can be modeled as a binomial random variable. A binomial random
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Table 7.1: Notations of formulae
nthres Number of partially signed certificates required to compute a valid cer-
tificate
prep Probability with which a single peer answers a request
ntotal Total number of peers in the peer-to-peer system
nke ys Number of peers holding keyshares
nreq Number of peers to which a request is sent
nrep Number of replies received to one request
p(nrep) Probability for receiving exactly nrep replies to one request
psucc Probability for receiving a sufficient (subject to nthres) number of replies
to one request
variable describes the outcome of repeated Bernoulli experiments each of which has a certain probability
of being successful. In our case, the probability of being successful is given by prep and the number of
repetitions is the number nreq of peers to which a request is sent. This results in
p(nrep) =

nreq
nrep

p
nrep
rep (1− prep)nreq−nrep
For a request to be successful it is not important to receive a certain number of replies, but to receive
a sufficiently large number to enable computation of a fully signed certificate. That is, a request is
successful if the number nrep of replies received is greater than or equal to nthres. The success probability
psucc(nthres) subject to nthres thus can be described as the sum of the probabilities of receiving a certain
number nrep of replies starting from nthres. The upper bound of the sum is given by the number nmul t of
peers to which a request is sent. We get
psucc(nthres) = p(nrep ≥ nthres) =
nreq∑
nrep=nthres
p(nrep)
The success probability subject to nthres (note that for reasons of presentation, the axis is inverted) and
nreq is shown in Figure 7.5. The success probability increases along with the number of users requested
and decreases if nthres increases.
7.2.2 Model of the Interaction Scheme for Unknown Shareholders
For the interaction scheme for unknown shareholders, we assume a random limitation of requested peers
subject to the distribution of keyshares and subject to the status of peers. That is, the interaction scheme
does not consider whether a peer to which a request is sent is authorized to contribute to security-related
decisions or able to answer within an acceptable time frame. This random restriction can be modeled by
a hypergeometric random variable. In our case, the hypergeometric variable describes the intersection
of the set of peers to which a request is sent and the set of peers that would potentially contribute to a
decision process. Thus, for the probability p(nrep) of receiving a certain number nrep of replies, we get
p(nrep) =
 nke ys ·prep
nrep
 ntotal−(nke ys ·prep)
nreq−nrep
 ntotal
nreq

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Figure 7.5: Success probability psucc(nthres) of the interaction scheme with known shareholders.
As for the interaction with known shareholders, a request is successful if the number nrep of replies
received is greater than or equal to nthres. The success probability psucc(nthres), thus, is again the sum of
the probabilities of receiving a certain number nrep of replies starting from nthres. The upper bound of
the sum is given by the number nreq of peers to which a request is sent. We obtain
psucc(nthres) = p(nrep ≥ nthres) =
nreq∑
nrep=nthres
p(nrep)
The resulting success probability subject to nthres (axis inverted) and nreq is shown in Figure 7.6. As
for the interaction scheme with known shareholders, the success probability decreases if nthres increases
and increases along with the number of users requested.
 25
 50
 75
 100
 5 10
 15
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
psucc
nreq
nthres
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
Figure 7.6: Success probability psucc(nthres) of the interaction scheme with unknown shareholders
If nreq is sufficiently small with respect to ntotal , the hypergeometric random variable can be approxi-
mated by a binomial random variable. Since our goal is to send a request to the least number of peers
possible, the binomial approximation to the hypergeometric random variable is applicable for our needs.
Figure 7.7 shows the resulting approximation error of the success probability psucc. The approximation
error is low for reasonable values of nthres and nreq subject to ntotal . Therefore, we may represent the
interaction scheme for unknown shareholders by a binomial random variable. This allows us to unify
the models for both interaction schemes.
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Figure 7.7: Approximation error if the interaction scheme for unknown shareholders is described by a binomial
random variable
7.2.3 Closed-Form Representation
We now derive a formula that provides a lower bound for the success probability psucc. Since we can
describe both interaction schemes based on a binomial random variable with different parameters, the
resulting formula is applicable for all interaction schemes discussed. With this, we aim at being able to
adjust the system parameters without knowing the exact network conditions as required for the models
presented previously. Since the Chernoff bound is a pessimistic approximation, it may be applicable also
if factors such as packet loss and churn are not known exactly but are within reasonable bounds.
Let p f ail = 1− psucc = p(nrep ≤ nthres − 1) be the probability that our system fails (that is, not enough
partial signatures were received by the requesting peer). We apply Chernoff’s bound [87]
p(nrep ≤ nthres − 1)≤ e(−τ(nthres−1))M(τ) ∀τ < 0
to obtain an upper bound for p f ail . The moment generating function M(τ) for nrep is given by
M(τ) = prepe
τ+ (1− prep)nmul t
thus,
p f ail ≤ e−τ(nthres−1)(prepeτ+ (1− prep))nreq
To obtain an upper bound for p f ail (thus, a lower bound for psucc) we have to find the τ that minimizes
the right hand side. Let
f (τ) = e−τ(nthres−1)(prepeτ+ (1− prep))nreq
thus,
d f
dτ
(τ) = e−τ(nthres−1)nreq(prepeτ+(1−prep))nreq−1prepeτ− nthrese−τ(nthres−1)(prepeτ+(1−prep))nreq
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By setting d f
dτ
= 0 and resolving to τ, we obtain
τ= ln

(nthres − 1)(1− prep)
nreqprep − prep(nthres − 1)

Thus, altogether,
psucc ≥ 1−

nreqprep − prep(nthres − 1)
(nthres − 1)(1− prep)
nthres−1(nthres − 1)(1− prep)
nreq − nthres + 1 + (1− prep)
nreq
The Chernoff bound is applicable as long as prep > 0.5 holds.
7.3 Evaluation
We now present the evaluation of a prototype of user-based cooperative decisions controlled by the
models developed previously. As for the evaluation of location-based intrusion response in mobile ad
hoc networks, we follow the methodology proposed in [45].
7.3.1 Goals of the Evaluation
The goal of the evaluation is to first provide a proof-of-concept of user-based cooperative decisions. For
this, we deploy a prototypic implementation in two testbeds. On this basis, we verify the correctness of
the stochastic models describing the interaction schemes presented in Section 7.1 by comparing model
predictions and testbed results.
7.3.2 Services of the System
The system under test is a Pastry structured peer-to-peer system as introduced in Section 6.2.1. We
implemented the cooperative decision process based on the non-interactive threshold signature scheme
presented in [96]. For the interaction of requesting peer and peers that potentially contribute to a
decision, the four different schemes for known and unknown shareholders sketched in Sections 7.1.1
and 7.1.2 are available.
7.3.3 Metrics for the Evaluation
The metric we consider for verifying the validity of the stochastic models is the success probability psucc
for the different interaction schemes. We determine the deviation of model predictions and results
obtained from testbed experiments for both open and closed form models.
7.3.4 Parameters of the System
The parameters of the peer-to-peer system are, as specified in Table 7.1, the number nthres of partially
signed certificates required to compute a full signature, the probability prep with which a single peer
answers a request, the total number of peers in the peer-to-peer system ntotal , the number nke ys of
peers holding keyshares, and the number nreq of peers to which a request is sent. Additionally, inherent
parameters of the testbeds such as packet loss, churn, and distribution of peer IDs that are beyond our
control affect system behavior.
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7.3.5 Selection of the Factors for the Evaluation
For our testbed studies, we vary the total number of peers in the peer-to-peer system ntotal , the number
nke ys of keyshares distributed among the peers, and the number nthres of partially signed certificates re-
quired to compute a full signature. We choose the parameters such that we obtain variations of few/many
peers, few/many keyshares, and high/low threshold.
7.3.6 Evaluation Technique
We validate the models for the different interaction schemes by experiments in the PlanetLab [80] and
G-Lab [19] testbeds. PlanetLab is a worldwide testbed currently consisting of about 1000 nodes dis-
tributed at about 500 sites that are connected over the Internet. The PlanetLab software offers SSH
accounts with a minimal Linux installation. Although minimum requirements regarding hardware and
connectivity of nodes are specified, the hardware and the connectivity of nodes in PlanetLab are hetero-
geneous.
G-Lab, on the other hand, is a German national testbed that currently consists of about 150 nodes at
6 universities. Compared to PlanetLab, the hardware and the connectivity are homogeneous and the
overall load of nodes is moderate (by now). G-Lab uses PlanetLab software for resource sharing and
access control of its nodes. Thus, our experimental setups can be executed on PlanetLab and on G-Lab
without modifications.
7.3.7 Workload of the System
Since our goal is not to evaluate the performance of the Pastry peer-to-peer system or of the testbeds
we use to run the experiments, but to verify the correctness of the stochastic models, the workload of
the system is low. We only issue one request at a time and wait for replies. This way, we eliminate
side-effects of an overloaded peer-to-peer system, which would result in falsified network parameters.
Still, we have no influence on the workload of the testbeds, which considerably affects the results as we
will discuss in the following.
7.3.8 Experimental Design
To verify the validity of the stochastic models describing the different interaction schemes, we selected
the parameters and factors used in the testbed experiments as follows.
Parameters
For the evaluation, the parameters as listed in Table 7.2 are used. In preliminary experiments, we found
that the effects caused by varying the probability prep with which a single peer answers a request are
equivalent to the effects caused by varying the number nke ys of peers holding keyshares. To keep the
number of experiments required to cover the factors used for evaluation in reasonable bounds, we,
thus, choose a fixed value for prep (random numbers following a shifted standard normal distribution
are drawn to determine whether a reply should be provided). The same reasoning holds for varying
the targeted success probability psucc and the number nthres of partially signed certificates required to
compute a valid certificate.
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Table 7.2: Parameters as used in the testbed experiments
Targeted success probability psucc = 0.95
Number nreq of requests issued Determined by model to achieve psucc = 0.95
Factors
The factors we used for the testbed experiments are the total number ntotal of peers, the number nke ys
of peers holding keyshares, the number nthres of partially signed certificates required for interpolation of
a valid certificate, and the probability prep with which a single peer answers a request in an acceptable
time. We combined the factors for the individual experiments such that we obtain reasonable variations
of nke ys high/low subject to ntotal , nthres high/medium/low subject to nke ys and prep high/low subject
to both nke ys and nthres. The resulting combinations are listed in Table 7.3. For each combination, we
performed 40 request/reply interactions.
Note that the number nthres of partially signed certificates required to compute a valid certificate given
in the table is used to instantiate the model. This way, we determine the number nreq of peers to which
a request has to be sent to achieve the targeted success probability psucc = 0.95. In addition, to validate
the model not only for the targeted success probability psucc = 0.95, but for any success probability
0≤ psucc ≤ 1, we varied the threshold in 2≤ nthres ≤ nke ys for the results presented in the following. That
is, after having performed the experiments, we determine how many of the 40 request/reply interactions
would have been successful if we would have used a different number of partially signed certificates
required to compute a valid certificate.
Table 7.3: Combinations of the factors as used in the testbed experiments
ntotal nke ys nthres prep
30 15 5 0.5
100 15 10 0.95
100 50 10 0.5
100 80 60 0.95
7.3.9 Analysis of the Results
In the following, we present selected results of the testbed studies that show all effects we observed. All
plots are given with 95% confidence intervals.
For each interaction scheme, we first discuss general observations followed by a discussion of the indi-
vidual experiments. For each experiment, we first compare the predictions of a naïve model instantiation
with the experimental results. That is, we first assume an ideal peer-to-peer system without effects such
as packet loss and churn. Afterwards, we adapt the model instantiation to the particular network pa-
rameters we measured during the experiment. We always present results for both the G-Lab and the
PlanetLab testbed. For selected scenarios, we present results for experiments conducted in both testbeds
simultaneously. For this, we established a peer-to-peer network consisting of nodes taken from G-Lab as
well as PlanetLab.
Where applicable, we include the lower bound approximation of the models derived in Section 7.2.3.
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Interaction Scheme for Known Shareholders
We now compare model predictions and testbed results for the interaction scheme for known sharehold-
ers. To analyze the general validity of the model as far as possible, we compare the model predictions
with the implementation based on a coordinating peer and based on Scribe as discussed in Section 7.1.1.
Coordinated Approach
The results obtained for the implementation of the interaction scheme for known shareholders based
on a coordinating peer are shown in Figures 7.8 and 7.9.
For both setups, we observe that the success probability psucc achieved in PlanetLab is significantly
below the success probability observed in G-Lab. The reason for this is the high load of PlanetLab and
the resulting churn and inherent packet loss and delay. This causes lost request messages as shown in the
tables listing the model adaptations. It stands out that, on the other hand, the probability prep with which
a single peer provides a reply to a request received is not affected significantly. We conclude that the lost
request messages are mainly caused by the peer that acts as mediator for the interaction of requesting
peer and peers holding keyshares. If this single point of failure is unavailable, request messages are not
relayed properly and the decision process cannot be completed.
Regarding the accuracy of the model, we see that the predictions of the naïve model instantiation
match the results obtained from G-Lab reasonably. As can be seen in the tables, the network conditions
measured in the testbed only show minor deviations from the naïve instantiation. Thus, we observe only
a minor deviation of naïve model predictions and predictions of the model adapted to the conditions of
G-Lab. For PlanetLab, we observe stronger deviations, in particular for the scenario with a total number
of ntotal = 100 peers shown in Figure 7.9. Here, the coordinating peer is affected heavily resulting in
that, in average, only 49 of the 65 requests required to achieve a success probability of psucc = 0.95
can be delivered. This is further amplified by the fact that, due to churn, only 69 of 80 peers holding
keyshares in the original scenario design were available in average.
Regarding the closed-form description of the models, we see that, for G-Lab, already the naïve in-
stantiation provides a correct lower bound for the success probability. For PlanetLab, the closed-form
provides correct results in the scenario with ntotal = 30 peers, shown in Figure 7.8, although the prob-
ability prep = 0.49 with which a single peer provides a reply is slightly below the range in which the
Chernoff bound is applicable.
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(b) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and adapted model for the G-Lab testbed
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(c) Comparison of naïve model predictions and
adapted model for the PlanetLab testbed
Naïve model G-Lab adaptation PlanetLab adaptation
ntotal 30 30 28
nke ys 15 15 12
prep 0.5 0.52 0.49
nreq 14 14 11
Figure 7.8: Success probability subject to threshold for the coordinated approach. Comparison of model predic-
tions and experimental results for a setup with 30 peers, 15 keyshares and threshold 5. Corresponding
naïve model instantiations and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in the testbeds are
given in the table.
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(b) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and adapted model for the G-Lab testbed
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(c) Comparison of naïve model predictions and
adapted model for the PlanetLab testbed
Naïve model G-Lab adaptation PlanetLab adaptation
ntotal 100 100 92
nke ys 80 79 68
prep 0.95 0.94 0.96
nreq 65 61 49
Figure 7.9: Success probability subject to threshold for the coordinated approach. Comparison of model predic-
tions and experimental results for a setup with 100 peers, 80 keyshares and threshold 60. Correspond-
ing naïve model instantiations and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in the testbeds
are given in the table.
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Scribe
Figures 7.10 to 7.12 show the results for the implementation of the interaction scheme for known
shareholders based on Scribe multicast groups.
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(b) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and adapted model for the G-Lab testbed
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(c) Comparison of naïve model predictions and
adapted model for the PlanetLab testbed
Naïve model G-Lab adaptation PlanetLab adaptation
ntotal 30 31 29
nke ys 15 15 12
prep 0.5 0.48 0.5
nreq 14 15 11
Figure 7.10: Success probability subject to threshold for the multicast approach based on Scribe. Comparison of
model predictions and experimental results for a setup with 30 peers, 15 keyshares and threshold 5.
Corresponding naïve model instantiations and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in
the testbeds are given in the table.
As for the approach based on a mediating peer described in the previous section, we observe that the
success probability is significantly lower for experiments conducted in PlanetLab than for experiments
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(a) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and experimental results for nodes taken
from PlanetLab and G-Lab simultaneously
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(b) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and adapted model for nodes taken from
PlanetLab and G-Lab simultaneously
Naïve model Testbed adaptation
ntotal 30 30
nke ys 15 14
prep 0.5 0.5
nreq 14 14
Figure 7.11: Success probability subject to threshold for the multicast approach based on Scribe. Comparison of
model predictions and experimental results for a setup with 30 peers, 15 keyshares, threshold 5, and
nodes taken from PlanetLab and G-Lab simultaneously. Corresponding naïve model instantiations
and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in the testbeds are given in the table.
conducted in G-Lab. Again, the probability prep with which a single peer provides a reply to a request
received is not affected significantly. Thus, delivery of packets containing partially signed certificates
works properly also in G-Lab. Yet, especially in the scenario with a total number of ntotal = 100 peers,
both the number nreq of requests delivered correctly and the number nke ys of peers holding keyshares
that are available in the multicast tree are degraded strongly compared to the scenario design. Thus, the
churn observed in PlanetLab affects both the entry point and the stability of the multicast tree. As can
be deduced from Figure 7.11, the tree can be stabilized if G-Lab peers are mixed among peers set up on
PlanetLab nodes.
Regarding model accuracy, the naïve instantiation matches the results obtained from G-Lab and from
both testbeds simultaneously without significant deviations for the scenario with a total number of
ntotal = 30 peers shown in Figures 7.10 and 7.11. It stands out that, for the scenario with ntotal = 100
peers, the results obtained from G-Lab are better than predicted by the model. This is caused by the high
stability of the multicast tree and its entry point. 78 of the 80 peers holding keyshares are available in
the multicast tree. As for the interaction based on a mediating peer presented in the previous section, we
observe that the results obtained from PlanetLab match the adapted model reasonably for the scenario
consisting of ntotal = 30 peers. For the scenario consisting of ntotal = 100 peers, the multicast tree can-
not be stabilized properly. Thus, a high success probability cannot be achieved. Still, for a low success
probability of psucc < 0.4, model predictions and testbed results match.
Regarding the closed-form description, the lower bound holds already in the naïve instantiation for
experiments conducted in G-Lab and with nodes taken from both G-Lab and PlanetLab. Also for the
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scenario consisting of ntotal = 30 peers taken from PlanetLab, the Chernoff bound is a reasonable esti-
mate of the success probability already for the naïve instantiation. Due to the unstable multicast tree,
we cannot rate the quality of the bound for the scenario consisting of ntotal = 100 peers taken from
PlanetLab.
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(b) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and adapted model for the G-Lab testbed
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 20  40  60  80  100  120
Su
cc
es
s 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
p s
u
cc
Threshold nthres
Model
Bound
PlanetLab
Adapted model
Adapted bound
(c) Comparison of naïve model predictions and
adapted model for the PlanetLab testbed
Naïve model G-Lab adaptation PlanetLab adaptation
ntotal 100 100 95
nke ys 80 78 51
prep 0.95 0.95 0.95
nreq 65 76 48
Figure 7.12: Success probability subject to threshold for the multicast approach based on Scribe. Comparison of
model predictions and experimental results for a setup with 100 peers, 80 keyshares and threshold
60. Corresponding naïve model instantiations and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed
in the testbeds are given in the table.
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Interaction Scheme for Unknown Shareholders
We now present selected results for the interaction scheme for unknown shareholders. As for the inter-
action scheme for known shareholders, we present results obtained for two different implementations
based on requests sent to randomly selected peer IDs and on a gossiping of requests in the Pastry leafset
as discussed in Section 7.1.2.
Random Shooting
The results obtained for the interaction of requesting peer and peers that contribute to a decision
process based on randomly selected peer IDs are shown in Figures 7.13 to 7.15.
As observed for the interaction schemes for known shareholders discussed in the previous section,
the success probability psucc measured in PlanetLab is significantly lower than the success probability
measured in G-Lab. This, again, is due to the inherent heterogeneity and the high load of the testbed
which results in an increased number of partially unavailable peers. In contrast to the network conditions
measured in the testbeds so far, it stands out that, for the random shooting interaction scheme, the
probability prep with which a single peer provides a reply to a request received is degraded significantly
compared to the experimental design. We put this down to duplicate requests. If a request is shot
randomly to a peer that does not hold a keyshare or to a non-existing peer ID, the request is routed to
the peer holding a keyshare with the peer ID numerically closest to the one the request was initially sent
to. Thus, requests that are sent to different randomly selected peer IDs may reach the same peer holding
a keyshare. Since multiple partial signatures that are produced with the same keyshare are of no use
for interpolation of a valid certificate, we drop these duplicate requests. In this case, the probability prep
with which the peer that received multiple requests provides a reply to a request received degrades.
Regarding model accuracy, churn and duplicate requests lead to an overestimate of the success prob-
ability psucc for the naïve model instantiation with respect to both G-Lab and PlanetLab. Yet, in contrast
to the results obtained for the interaction schemes with known shareholders, we observe a reasonable
match of the models adapted to the conditions in G-Lab, PlanetLab, and for a peer-to-peer system con-
sisting of nodes taken from both testbeds. We conclude that, due to not depending on dedicated peers,
the random shooting interaction scheme is more robust to packet loss and churn.
Regarding the closed-form model, the Chernoff bound is not applicable in the scenario with a total
number of ntotal = 100 peers and nke ys = 50 shareholders shown in Figure 7.13. This is due to the
probability prep with which a single peer provides a reply to a request received that, caused by duplicate
requests, is significantly below 0.5 in this scenario. Also for the scenarios consisting of ntotal = 100
peers of which nke ys = 80 hold keyshares, shown in Figures 7.14 and 7.15, we observe that the naïve
instantiation of the Chernoff bound overestimates the success probability psucc. This is caused by the fact
that, in these scenarios, a high number nreq of requests with respect to the total number of peers ntotal is
sent. Thus, we get a high error of the binomial approximation for the hypergeometric random variable
which leads to the incorrect naïve bound. Still, the instantiations of the bound that are adapted to the
network conditions observed provide correct results.
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(c) Comparison of naïve model predictions and
adapted model for the PlanetLab testbed
Naïve model G-Lab adaptation PlanetLab adaptation
ntotal 100 100 92
nke ys 50 50 39
prep 0.5 0.43 0.4
nreq 49 44 43
Figure 7.13: Success probability subject to threshold for the random shooting approach. Comparison of model
predictions and experimental results for a setup with 100 peers, 50 keyshares and threshold 10.
Corresponding naïve model instantiations and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in
the testbeds are given in the table.
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(b) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and adapted model for the G-Lab testbed
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(c) Comparison of naïve model predictions and
adapted model for the PlanetLab testbed
Naïve model G-Lab adaptation PlanetLab adaptation
ntotal 100 100 95
nke ys 80 79 68
prep 0.95 0.72 0.75
nreq 81 65 62
Figure 7.14: Success probability subject to threshold for the random shooting approach. Comparison of model
predictions and experimental results for a setup with 100 peers, 80 keyshares and threshold 60.
Corresponding naïve model instantiations and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in
the testbeds are given in the table.
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(a) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and experimental results for nodes taken
from PlanetLab and G-Lab simultaneously
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(b) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and adapted model for nodes taken from
PlanetLab and G-Lab simultaneously
Naïve model Testbed adaptation
ntotal 100 97
nke ys 80 74
prep 0.95 0.74
nreq 81 64
Figure 7.15: Success probability subject to threshold for the random shooting approach. Comparison of model
predictions and experimental results for a setup with 100 peers, 80 keyshares, threshold 60, and
nodes taken from PlanetLab and G-Lab simultaneously. Corresponding naïve model instantiations
and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in the testbeds are given in the table.
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Gossiping
The results for the implementation of the interaction scheme for unknown shareholders based on
gossiping a request to logical neighbors are shown in Figures 7.16 to 7.18.
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(c) Comparison of naïve model predictions and
adapted model for the PlanetLab testbed
Naïve model G-Lab adaptation PlanetLab adaptation
ntotal 100 101 94
nke ys 50 50 38
prep 0.5 0.53 0.68
nreq 49 79 59
Figure 7.16: Success probability subject to threshold for the gossiping approach. Comparison of model predictions
and experimental results for a setup with 100 peers, 50 keyshares and threshold 10. Corresponding
naïve model instantiations and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in the testbeds are
given in the table.
As for all experiments presented so far, the success probability psucc observed in PlanetLab is signifi-
cantly below the success probability observed in G-Lab due to temporarily unavailable peers caused by
the high load of the testbed. In contrast to the random shooting approach discussed previously, the prob-
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ability prep with which a single peer provides a reply to a request received is not degraded, but increased
compared to the scenario design. This is due to the fact that if a peer holding a keyshare receives a
duplicate request, in the gossiping implementation, the request is not dropped, but forwarded further.
Except for the scenario consisting of ntotal = 100 peers of which nke ys = 80 hold keyshares, we also ob-
serve an increased number of requested peers than required to achieve the targeted success probability
of psucc = 0.95. This is due to the fact that the counter indicating the remaining number of partially
signed certificates required is rounded to the next higher integer when the request is sent to the leafset
of the initiating peer. Considering, for example, the scenario consisting of ntotal = 100 peers of which
nke ys = 50 hold keyshares, the model demands to send nreq = 49 requests to achieve the targeted success
probability of psucc = 0.95. For a typical Pastry leafset consisting of 24 peers, the counter indicating the
number of partial signatures required should be set to 49 · 24−1 = 2.04, but is rounded to 3.
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(b) Comparison of naïve model predictions
and adapted model for nodes taken from
PlanetLab and G-Lab simultaneously
Naïve model Testbed adaptation
ntotal 100 89
nke ys 50 45
prep 0.5 0.55
nreq 49 69
Figure 7.17: Success probability subject to threshold for the gossiping approach. Comparison of model predictions
and experimental results for a setup with 100 peers, 50 keyshares, threshold 10, and nodes taken
from PlanetLab and G-Lab simultaneously. Corresponding naïve model instantiations and instantia-
tions adapted to the conditions observed in the testbeds are given in the table.
Regarding model accuracy, we observe that the naïve model instantiation underestimates the success
probability psucc measured in the testbeds except for the experiments conducted in PlanetLab for the
scenario consisting of ntotal = 100 peers of which nke ys = 80 hold keyshares. In this case, the packet loss
and churn of PlanetLab outbalance the increased number of requests initiated due to rounding effects.
For all other experiments, the increased success probability compared to the model predictions can be
explained by duplicate requests that are forwarded instead of being dropped and an increased number
of request messages due to rounding effects.
Regarding the closed-form, the binomial approximation to the hypergeometric random variable and,
thus, the Chernoff bound is not applicable for the scenario consisting of ntotal = 100 peers of which
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nke ys = 50 hold keyshares shown in Figures 7.16 and 7.17. For the scenario consisting of ntotal = 100
peers of which nke ys = 80 hold keyshares shown in Figure 7.18, the closed-form provides a correct lower
bound.
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(c) Comparison of naïve model predictions and
adapted model for the PlanetLab testbed
Naïve model G-Lab adaptation PlanetLab adaptation
ntotal 100 101 90
nke ys 80 80 64
prep 0.95 0.99 0.99
nreq 81 87 72
Figure 7.18: Success probability subject to threshold for the gossiping approach. Comparison of model predictions
and experimental results for a setup with 100 peers, 80 keyshares and threshold 60. Corresponding
naïve model instantiations and instantiations adapted to the conditions observed in the testbeds are
given in the table.
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7.4 Conclusion - User-based Cooperative Decisions
In this chapter, we discussed user-based cooperative decisions in peer-to-peer systems. By means of
threshold cryptography, we can compensate missing central trusted instances in spontaneously estab-
lished peer-to-peer systems. By involving users directly in security-related decisions, we can compensate
missing security policies.
When users are involved in the decision process, we cannot assume that a user is available for con-
tributing to a decision at any time. The threshold cryptography approach deployed in our scenario must
be able to deal with this. We identified non-interactive variants of threshold cryptography as appropriate
solutions. Here, no knowledge about which shareholders contribute to a decision process is required
in advance, among the shareholders and at the peer that requests a security-related decision. As soon
as a sufficiently large number of partially signed certificates is collected by the requesting peer, a valid
certificate can be interpolated.
For the interaction between requesting peer and peers that potentially contribute to a decision pro-
cess, we discussed different interaction schemes. To be able to control the number of users involved
in a decision, we provided mathematical models describing the interaction schemes. Since the exact
conditions such as packet loss and churn in a peer-to-peer system might not be known, we additionally
derived a lower bound for the success probability (that is, the probability that a sufficiently large number
of partially signed certificates can be collected from one request) of an interaction scheme subject to the
number of users requested.
In a series of experiments in two different testbeds, we verified the general applicability of the models
developed. Although we partially observed deviations of predictions made by a naïve model instantiation
assuming an ideal network and the results measured in testbeds, predictions of model instantiations
adapted to the conditions of the testbeds match the testbed results reasonably. Where applicable, the
lower bound provided correct estimates without requiring an adaptation to the network conditions.
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8 Conclusions
In this thesis, we scrutinized how two essential security services, intrusion response and security-related
decisions, can be realized in networks operating in absence of a communication infrastructure and with-
out central, trusted instances. We considered the application scenario of a communication network based
on mobile ad hoc networks and peer-to-peer applications, as it might be established spontaneously in
large-scale disaster scenarios. We assumed that the network is established scenario-wide, consisting
of any devices, of affected civilians as well as of first responders and reconstruction units, that are
equipped with wireless communication capabilities. Within such a network, mechanisms to deal with
malfunctioning devices or intended misbehavior are required. We focused on the question of how to
exclude such devices from the network efficiently, once detected. We further assumed that predefined
closed user groups exist within the network, but that dynamic inter-group access to restricted resources
should be possible. The second focus of the thesis was set on how corresponding security objectives like
authentication and access control can be realized without central, trusted instances and security policies.
To exclude misbehaving devices from the network, we developed an intrusion response mechanism
that operates based on quarantined areas that are established at locations where misbehavior is de-
tected. This way, we render the intrusion response mechanism insusceptible to changes in addresses
of misbehaving nodes. From our point of view, this is a basic step, since preventing to be identified
and penalized by changing addresses is possible with little effort but causes a high impact in a scenario
where devices are beyond a central control. Being independent from addresses further enables reacting
to adverse situations in which the origin of a network interference cannot be traced-back to a particular
network address. A sophisticated jamming of radio frequencies, for example, may considerably degrade
the performance of routes passing through the jammed area, thus affecting also devices that are not
located in radio range of the jamming device.
We evaluated the location-based intrusion response in a series of simulation studies. Our objective was
to compare the performance to an address-based solution. To show the effects of changes in addresses
of misbehaving nodes, we combined a black hole attack with a Sybil attack. Our core findings show
that, in this scenario, the location-based intrusion response is clearly superior. It can be used to support
preventive security mechanisms based on means of cryptography. However, it is afflicted with inherent
drawbacks. These result from quarantined benign nodes that are excluded from the network by the
location-based intrusion response because of their proximity to misbehaving nodes.
In order to be able to predict system behavior for scenarios different from the ones we studied by
means of simulation, we developed an analytical model that describes the performance of the location-
based intrusion response. We mutually validated model predictions and results obtained from simulation
studies.
To improve the location-based intrusion response, we designed and evaluated two approaches. First,
we investigated to what extent an adaptive transmission power can be used to reduce the size of quaran-
tined areas. Our results obtained in simulation studies showed that the negative effects of the location-
based intrusion response caused by quarantined benign nodes can be diminished effectively. Yet, the
routing protocol we used for the evaluation was not designed for an adaptive transmission power. In
particular in scenarios with a high node mobility, we observed side-effects that caused frequent route
breaks which rendered an adaptive transmission power infeasible in this cases.
As second approach for improving the location-based intrusion response, we enabled delayed commu-
nication by harnessing the mobility of quarantined benign nodes. For this, data that has to be sent by a
quarantined node is buffered until the node left quarantine. Results based on simulation studies showed
that this approach can nearly fully recover network performance in terms of the packet delivery ratio,
even in presence of multiple misbehaving nodes. On the downside, the transmission delay measured
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from source to destination is increased significantly. Thus, a delayed communication can be used for
applications with weak time constraints.
For the second focus of this thesis, that is, for achieving security objectives like authentication and
access control without central, trusted instances and security policies, we designed means for user-
based cooperative decisions. By involving authorized users directly, we enable security related decisions
without requiring predefined security policies. By means of threshold cryptography, we can enforce a
cooperative decision process. This way, we prevent that single, unauthorized users holding compromised
devices can decide on security-related requests unrestrictedly.
When involving users in a decision process, we have to take into account users that are not able to
contribute to a cooperative decision in a reasonable time. Thus, a security-related request has to be sent
to a sufficiently large number of users, taking into account potential missing replies. On the other hand,
the number of users requested per decision should be minimized. Considering that the main tasks of
users in disaster scenarios are, most likely, different ones, involving a user in to many decision processes
may degrade the quality of experience and, thus, the feasibility of user-based cooperative decisions.
For controlling the number of users involved in a decision process, we developed analytical models
based on different schemes for the interaction between a user that issues a security-related request and
users that potentially contribute to the corresponding decision process. We validated the models by con-
trolling a prototype that enables user-based cooperative decisions deployed in two different testbeds. The
results proved the applicability of the models for varying network conditions observed in the testbeds.
Well-controllable communication infrastructures and central, trusted instances are key building blocks
of security mechanisms for contemporary communication networks. Altogether, the results we pre-
sented in this thesis show that, also without these key building blocks, a reasonable level of security for
infrastructure-less and decentralized communication networks can be achieved.
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A Notations of Formulae
Notations are listed for the chapter they were first used.
A.1 Chapter 2
PS Power emitted by a sending antenna
PR Power received by a receiving antenna
Siso Power density of an isotropic antenna
Ae f f ,iso Effective area of an isotropic antenna
PR, f ree,iso Power received assuming a free space model and an isotropic an-
tenna
Somni Power density of an omnidirectional antenna
Ae f f ,omni Effective area of an omnidirectional antenna
PR, f ree,omni Power received assuming a free space model and an omnidirectional
antenna
PR,twora y Power received assuming a two ray ground reflection model
rC Cross-over distance
r reqSD Route request for Node D initiated by Node S
ipX Address of Node X
hopX Distance to Node X in hops
snX Sequence number of Node X
rrepDS Route reply for r reqSD
rer rD Route error message for Destination D
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A.2 Chapter 3
fs y b Sybil frequency
tmon Monitoring interval of the intrusion detection system in seconds
nX ,rec Number of packets a node X received during tmon
nX , f orw Number of packets a node X forwarded during tmon
wbal Factor to balance nX ,rec and nX , f orw
RX ,Y Rating for node Y determined by the intrusion detection system
thresblack Threshold of RY for classification as black hole
rquar Radius of quarantined areas
tdetect Time needed to detect a black hole
t reset Time after which quarantined areas are revoked
rt rans Transmission range of nodes
Anet Size of the network
l Side length of the network area
dhop Average distance per hop
ntotal Total number of nodes in the network
nblack Number of black hole nodes in the network
ns Number of nodes reached in step s of the ring search
ρ Network density in nodes per area
A.3 Chapter 4
dcenter Distance to center of closest quarantined area
A.4 Chapter 5
t ret rans Time between two consecutive retransmission attempts
nret rans Maximum number of retransmission attempts per packet
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A.5 Chapter 6
Ki i-th keyshare of Key K
q(x) Polynomial used to generate keyshares
Pi i-th peer
Si Partial signature generated with i-th keyshare
S(m) Signature of Message m
Li i-th Lagrange factor
A.6 Chapter 7
nthres Number of partially signed certificates required to compute a valid cer-
tificate
prep Probability with which a single peer answers a request
nke ys Number of peers holding keyshares
nreq Number of peers to which a request is sent
nrep Number of replies received to one request
p(nrep) Probability for receiving exactly nrep replies to one request
psucc Probability for receiving a sufficient (subject to nthres) number of replies
to one request
A.5 Chapter 6 123

B Author’s Publications
B.1 Publications as First Author
1. André König, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. A Stochastic Analysis of Secure Joint De-
cision Processes in Peer-to-Peer Systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Communications (ICC ’09). 2009.
2. André König, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. An Evaluation of Cooperative Decisions in Peer-
to-Peer Systems - Mathematics vs. Testbed Studies. In Proceedings of the 9th Würzburg Workshop on
IP: Joint ITG and Euro-NF Workshop ’Visions of Future Generation Networks’ (EuroView ’09). 2009.
3. André König, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. On the Implications of Adaptive Transmission
Power for Assisting MANET Security. In Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Workshop on
Wireless Mesh and Ad Hoc Networks (WiMAN 2009). 2009.
4. André König, Aleksandra Kovacevic, and Ralf Steinmetz. Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities of
Setting up Experimental Peer-to-Peer Facilities - A Personal Story. In Proceedings of Panlab Workshop
on Setup and Operation of Open Testbed Infrastructures in the Context of NGN and Future Internet -
Status Quo and Quo Vadis in conjunction with 16. ITG/GI Fachtagung Kommunikation in Verteilten
Systemen (KiVS ’09). 2009.
5. André König, Daniel Seither, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. An Analytical Model of Routing,
Misbehavior, and Countermeasures in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM ’09). 2009.
6. André König, Christian Gottron, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. Harnessing Delay Tolerance
to Increase Delivery Ratios in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks with Misbehaving Nodes. In Proceedings of
the Fourth IEEE International Workshop on Wireless and Sensor Networks Security (WSNS ’08). 2008.
7. André König, Matthias Hollick, Tronje Krop, and Ralf Steinmetz. GeoSec: quarantine zones for
mobile ad hoc networks. Security and Communication Networks (Wiley SCN), 2:271–288, 2008.
8. André König, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. Kooperative Sicherheitsmechanismen für Peer-
to-Peer Systeme - Varianten und Erfolgsmodelle. In Proceedings of 3. Essener Workshop ’Neue Her-
ausforderungen in der Netzsicherheit’ (EWNS ’08). 2008.
9. André König, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. Security for Future Wireless and Decentral-
ized Communication Networks - Harnessing Cooperation, Space, and Time. In Proceedings of the
8th Würzburg Workshop on IP: Joint EuroNF, ITC, and ITG Workshop ’Visions of Future Generation
Networks’ (EuroView ’08). 2008.
10. André König, Ralf Ackermann, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. Geographically Secure Rout-
ing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: A Cross-layer Based Approach. In Proceedings of the Workshop
on Long-Term and Dynamical Aspects of Information Security in conjunction with Emerging Trends in
Information and Communication Security (ETRICS ’06). 2006.
11. André König, Matthias Hollick, Johannes Schmitt, and Ralf Steinmetz. Sicherheit und Verfügbarkeit
in mobilen Ad hoc Netzen - Ein geographischer, schichtenübergreifender Ansatz. In Proceedings of
2. Essener Workshop ’Neue Herausforderungen in der Netzsicherheit’ (EWNS ’06). 2006.
125
B.2 Publications as Coauthor
12. Christian Gottron, André König, and Ralf Steinmetz. A Cross-layer Approach Towards Robustness
of Mobile Peer-to-Peer Networks. Submitted to the 45th IEEE International Conference on Communi-
cations (ICC ’11), 2011.
13. Christian Gottron, André König, and Ralf Steinmetz. A Cross-Layer Approach for Increasing Ro-
bustness of Mobile Peer-to-Peer Networks. In Proceedings of the ’Security in NGNs and the Future
Internet’ Workshop collocated with the 3rd Future Internet Symposium 2010 (FIS ’10). 2010.
14. Christian Gottron, André König, and Ralf Steinmetz. A Survey on Security in Mobile Peer-to-Peer
Architectures - Overlay-based vs. Underlay-based Approaches. Accepted for MDPI Future Internet
special issue ’Network vs. Application Based Solutions for NGN’, 2010.
15. Christian Gottron, André König, and Ralf Steinmetz. A Testbed-based Analysis of the Incorrect
Lookup Routing Attack on the Pastry DHT. In Proceedings of the 10th Würzburg Workshop on IP:
Joint ITG, ITC, and Euro-NF Workshop ’Visions of Future Generation Networks’ (EuroView ’10). 2010.
16. Christian Gottron, Pedro Larbig, André König, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. Testbed Eval-
uation eines Black Hole-Angriffes auf ein Ad hoc Netz. In Proceedings of 4. Essener Workshop ’Neue
Herausforderungen in der Netzsicherheit (EWNS ’10). 2010.
17. Christian Gottron, Pedro Larbig, André König, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. The Rise and
Fall of the AODV Protocol: A Testbed Study on Practical Routing Attacks. In Proceedings of the 35th
IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN ’10) (accepted for presentation). 2010.
18. André Miede, Nedislav Nedyalkov, Christian Gottron, André König, Nicolas Repp, and Ralf Stein-
metz. A Generic Metamodel for IT Security - Attack Modeling for Distributed Systems. In Pro-
ceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Availability, Reliability, and Security (ARES ’10).
2010.
19. Ralf Steinmetz and André König. On Simulations, Models, and Testbeds - Possibilities and Pitfalls.
Submitted to Elsevier Performance Evaluation Special Issue on Selected Papers of MSWiM 2009, 2010.
20. Christian Gottron, André König, Matthias Hollick, Sonja Bergsträßer, Thomas Hildebrandt, and Ralf
Steinmetz. Quality of Experience of Voice Communication in Large-Scale Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.
In Proceedings of the Second IFIP Wireless Days 2009. 2009.
21. André Miede, Christian Gottron, André König, Nedislav Nedyalkov, Nicolas Repp, and Ralf Stein-
metz. Cross-organizational Security in Distributed Systems. Technical report, Multimedia Commu-
nications Lab (KOM), TU Darmstadt, 2009.
22. Johannes Schmitt, Oliver Heckmann, André König, Matthias Hollick, and Ralf Steinmetz. ENUM-
Erweiterung zur Sicherung der Kommunikation zwischen VoIP-Infrastrukturen. In Proceedings of 2.
Essener Worshop ’Neue Herausforderungen in der Netzsicherheit’ (EWNS ’06). 2006.
126 Publications as Coauthor
C Curriculum Vitae
Personal Information
André König
Tannenweg 9
64560 Riedstadt
Germany
Education
10/1998–09/2005 Diploma in Computer Science (with honors), Technische Universität Darm-
stadt, Darmstadt, Germany
08/1997–09/1998 Alternative service, German Red Cross, Darmstadt, Germany
08/1988–07/1997 High school ’Gymnasium Gernsheim’, Gernsheim, Germany
08/1984–07/1988 Elementary school, Biebesheim, Germany
Professional Experience
08/1998–09/2005 Consultant for network and system design, Drumm Systemhaus, Gernsheim,
Germany
Academic Experience
since 10/2005 Doctoral candidate and research staff member, Multimedia Communications
Lab (KOM), Technische Universität Darmstadt
since 10/2005 Teaching assistant for the masters level course ’Communication Networks I’,
Multimedia Communications Lab (KOM), Technische Universität Darmstadt
since 10/2005 Tutor for the seminar ’Advanced Topics of Future Internet Research’, Multime-
dia Communications Lab (KOM), Technische Universität Darmstadt
since 04/2006 Tutor for the seminar ’Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks’, Multimedia Com-
munications Lab (KOM), Technische Universität Darmstadt, in cooperation
with the Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics Research
since 10/2008 Local project supervisor of the research project ’German Lab (G-Lab), National
Platform for Future Internet Studies’ funded by the German Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Research, Multimedia Communications Lab (KOM), Technische
Universität Darmstadt
since 04/2009 Head of the research group ’Network Security’, Multimedia Communications
Lab (KOM), Technische Universität Darmstadt
09/2009–12/2009 Research scholar, Multimedia Operating System and Networking Group lead by
Professor Klara Nahrstedt, Department of Computer Science, University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), funded by the German Academic Exchange
Service (DAAD) (09/2009–11/2009)
01/2006–10/2007 Local project supervisor of the research project ’SicAri - A Security Architecture
and its Tools for Ubiquitous Internet Usage’ funded by the German Ministry of
Education and Research, Multimedia Communications Lab (KOM), Technische
Universität Darmstadt
127

D Erklärung laut §9 der Promotionsordnung
Ich versichere hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation allein und nur unter Verwendung der
angegebenen Literatur verfasst habe. Die Arbeit hat bisher noch nicht zu Prüfungszwecken gedient.
Darmstadt, 2011
Dipl.-Inform. André König
